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THE IVANHOE IRRIGATION DISTRICT, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, v. ALL PARTIES AND PERSONS, etc., 
Defendants; COURTNEY McCRACKEN et al., Re-
spondents; THE PEOPLE, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Waters-Irrigation Districts-Confirmation Proceedings.-A 
proceeding by an irrigation district to obtain confirmation of 
a contract entered into with the United States under the 
Irrigation District Federal Cooperation Law (Wat. Code, 
§ 23175 et seq.), by which the United States undertook to 
deliver water from the Central Valley Project to the district 
and to expend funds for construction of a distribution system 
within the district, is a special proceeding in rem brought 
against all persons having or claiming an interest in the forma-
tion of the district and in operation of the contract and the 
lands affected thereby; it fixes the status of all property within 
the district lawfully affected by the contract, final judgment 
forecloses further inquiry into matters to which it properly 
relates, and within its pertinent issues it is binding on the 
world at large. 
[2] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Confirmation Proceedings-Plead-
ing.-In a proceeding by an irrigation district to obtain con-
firmation of a contract entered into with the United States, 
by which the United States undertook to deliver water from 
the Central Valley Project to the district and to expend funds 
for construction of a distribution system within the district, 
the State Engineer, who appeared after a default against him 
was set aside, had the right to file an answer by his own 
counsel. (Gov. Code, §§ 11040, 11041.) 
[3] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Confirmation Proceedings-Decree. 
-If a contract entered into by an irrigation district with the 
United States under the Irrigation District Federal Coopera-
[1] See Cal.Jur., Waters,§ 612 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Waters, § 515; [2] Waters, § 517; 
[3] Waters, §520(1); [4] Waters, §522; [5] Waters, §518; 
[6] Waters,§§ 40, 45; [7] Waters,§ 75; [8] Waters,§ 154; [9, 13, 
20, 25, 27, 32, 40] Waters, § 538; [10, 11, 18] Waters, § 24; [12, 
16] Waters, § 287; [14] Waters, §§ 24, 314; [15] Waters, § 299; 
[17] Waters, §25; [19] Waters, §1; [21, 26, 34] Waters, §§529, 
538; [22-24] Waters, §§ 529, 534; [28] Constitutional Law, § 159; 
[29, 30] Waters, § 318; [31, 33] Waters, § 539; [35, 37] Waters, 
§ 514; [36] Statutes, §.10; [38, 39] Public Utilities, § 10; [41] 
Waters, § 529. 
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tion Law (Wat. Code, § 23175 et seq.) fails of confirmation 
on one material ground it must fail of confirmation as a whole. 
(Wat. Code,§ 22680.) 
[ 4] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Confirmation Proceedings-Appeal. 
-In a proceeding by by an irrigation district to obtain con-
firmation of a contract entered into with the United States, 
by which the United States undertook to deliver water from 
the Central Valley Project to the district and to expend funds 
for construction of a distribution system within the district, 
the injunctive provisions of a judgment prohibiting the dis-
trict from refusing or failing to supply water to an owner 
of irrigable land within the district and from proceeding under 
the contract may be disregarded on appeal where the judg-
ment declaring invalidity of the contract must be affirmed, 
and they may not be taken as prohibiting the parties from 
negotiating a new contract or from continuing distribution of 
water pending such negotiations. 
[5] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Confirmation Proceedings-Hear-
ing.-In a proceeding by an irrigation district to obtain 
confirmation of a contract entered into with the United States, 
by which the United States undertook to deliver water from 
the Central Valley Project to the district and to expend funds 
for construction of a distribution system within the district, 
the trial court properly refused to eliminate the issue of title 
or ownership of water from the case where the United States 
had acquired in its own name rights to certain domestic waters 
which were essential to the success of the Central Valley Proj-
ect and which were not acquired for any purpose other than 
for the use and benefit of such project, and where a trust 
relationship existed between the state and water users of the 
state, including water users of the district, as to all waters the 
control of which had been acquired by the state by appropria-
tion or purchase. 
[6] !d.-Riparian Rights-Nature and Extent of Right.-Under the 
common-law doctrine of riparian rights, the riparian owner 
had the right to insist that the full flow of the stream continue 
to pass by his land in its natural state whether or not he 
needed the water; such a right was a property right which 
vested in such owner and was protected by state and federal 
Constitutions, and could not be limited or impaired without 
due process of law and just compensation. 
[7] !d.-Riparian Rights-As Restricted to Beneficial Use.-Subse-
quent to adoption of Const., art. XIV, § 3, in 1928, subjecting 
enjoyment of the riparian right to the rule of reasonable bene-
ficial use, vested rights of the riparian owner continue to 
attach to his land as a part and parcel of the land itself, and 
as such are necessarily protected from unlawful encroachment 
by both state and federal Constitutions. 
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[8a, 8b] !d.-Appropriation of Water-Waters Appropriable.-
The people of the state may avail themselves hy appropriation 
or other lawful means of the right to the use of waters to 
which a prior lawful use has not attached, and unappropriated 
domestic waters of the state come within this category. 
[9] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-An 
irrigation district is trustee for landowners within the district 
and limited in its trust to receive and distribute water to them. 
[10] !d.-Ownership-Status of State as Trustee.-The state is not 
the owner of domestic water of the state in the sense that it 
has absolute power and dominion over it to the exclusion of 
rights of those who have the beneficial interest; the title is 
an equitable one residing in the water users of the state, and 
the state as an entity is the holder of the legal title as trustee 
for the benefit of the people of the state, all of whom in the 
last analysis are the water users of the state. 
[11] !d.-Ownership-Conditions Precedent.-Compliance with 
provisions of the ·water Code and related statutory provisions 
is necessary in order that the right of the people of the state 
to use domestic water, individually, collectively or in a cor-
porate capacity, may be acquired, and such compliance must 
be consistent with the trust relationship incident to the right 
to use the water. 
[12] !d.-Transfer of Water Rights.-Occupying a trust relation-
ship to the people, as water users of the state, it would be 
incompetent for the state to divest itself of legal title to 
domestic waters by grant, assignment or otherwise, inconsistent 
with rights of the beneficiaries, and it would be inconsistent 
with the trust for the state to attempt to pass the legal title 
freed from the trust to any third party, including the United 
States. 
[13] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-As 
trustee for the people, as water users of the state, the state and 
its agencies, including an irrigation district, are bound faith-
fully to administer the trust and are answerable to the courts, 
in the exercise of their traditional powers in equity, for the 
proper discharge of their stewardship; they must administer 
it consistently and not in violation of the rights of the bene-
ficiaries. 
[14] !d.-Ownership-Status as Trustee: Contracts Pertaining to 
Water Rights.-The state in the administration of its trust 
for users of domestic waters may prescribe or provide for 
reasonable terms or conditions to which beneficiaries must 
conform in order to have the benefit of expenditures made 
[8] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 236; Am.Jur., Waters, § 294. 
[9] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 638. 
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necessary in providing benefits, and these terms or conditions 
may be provided for by statute or by contracts when duly 
authorized by law. 
[15a, 15b] !d.-Transfer of Water Rights-Rights and Duties of 
Transferee.-When an outside party, such as the United States, 
by contract, legislation or otherwise, steps into the shoes of the 
state to administer a trust for the benefit of water users by 
development, conservation and distribution of the trust res, 
it is bound by the same rules of law as surround and govern 
the state or any other purveyor of waters of the state for the 
benefit of its water users, as trustee for such beneficial owners, 
and it is answerable for the faithful performance of such 
trust. 
[16] !d.-Transfer of Water Rights-Powers of State.-The state 
may not lawfully dispossess itself of the title to domestic 
water and may not surrender its control thereof in any way 
inconsistent with administration of the trust under which title 
is held, but may by general law prescribe the terms and con-
ditions under which the several classes of water users may 
become secure in their right to the water and use thereof. 
[17] !d.-Ownership-Private Rights.-Water users of the state 
whose rights have not become vested by statute or contract, 
but who are dependent on an adequate supply of fresh water 
for their existence in the manifold uses to which it may be 
supplied, have an inchoate right to such uses subject to enforce-
ment and equal protection of the law, and such right is neces-
sarily dependent on compliance with reasonable rules and regu-
lations attending it and to the circumstances of each case, 
such as an adequate water supply, ability of the supplier to 
furnish the water, and reasonable payment for the service. 
[18a, 18b] !d.-Ownership-Status of State as Trustee.-Title to 
unappropriated domestic waters of the state is in the State 
of California in trust; the trust character of such title is 
anchored in the state by constitutional provisions, by statutes 
enacted in furtherance thereof, and by decisional law of the 
state; the beneficiaries of such trust are the water users of 
the state who in a general sense constitute all of the people 
of the state; among such beneficiaries are present or pros-
pective users who individually or in properly classified groups 
bring themselves within the orbit of the state law under which 
they may be in a position to demand benefits without dis-
crimination; and within such category are the landowners of 
an irrigation district. 
[19] Id.-Law Governing.-The federal government both by legis-
lation and court decision has recognized that the law of this 
state is determinative of rights to water in this state. 
Jan.1957] IvANHOE lRR. DrsT. v. ALL PARTIES 
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[20a., 20b] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-
In all transactions affecting rights to domestic water between 
the United States and the State of California or its 
such as an irrigation district, the are with trust 
property held by the state or by those who have acquired 
rights to it from the state or otherwise the benefit of the 
real owners, who are the present and 
of the state who may become entitled 
and whatever interest or title the United States has acquired 
to water appropriation, or other means in fur-
therance the execution of its trust relationship with the 
water users of the state is to applicable 
water law of the state. 
[2la, 2lb] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Property and 
Water Rights.-Insofar as a contract between an irrigation 
district and the United States provides for the construction 
of works for the storage and distribution of water to and by 
the district, the relationship of the parties is that of debtor 
and creditor; on completion of the construction work the dis-
trict is obligated under the law to pay for the same within 
40 years in equal annual installments, and on completion of 
such payments the district is entitled to ownership of the 
works and property of the storage and distribution system 
free from any claims of the United States. 
[22] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Incurring Debts.-An 
irrigation district contracting with the United States for the 
construction of a distribution system within the district is 
authorized by law to obtain funds for that purpose from the 
United States with or without the issuance of irrigation dis-
trict bonds (Wat. Code, §§ 23280-23289), and it can contract 
for the payment for water distributed to it by or through an 
outside source at a fixed point of delive1·y on the payment of 
charges agreed on from funds of its own, if available. (W at. 
Code, § 22228.) 
[23] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Incurring Debts-Giv-
ing Security.-The United States has the right to demand that 
assurances of security for repayment of monies advanced by it 
to an irrigation district for construction of a distribution 
system within the district he included in the contract between 
the district and the United States providing for such construc-
tion. 
[24] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Incurring Debts-Repay-
ment.-An irrigation district has the right and duty to include 
in its contract with the United States for construction of a 
dish·ihution system within the district exprrss provisions for 
adequate clearance of its obligations to repay, including the 
designation of the amount expended or to be expended by the 
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United States for the benefit of the district and its land-
owners, or a workable provision as to how the money advanced 
by the United States may be ascertained when the time for 
final accounting, repayment and acquittance arrives, together 
with designation of a definite time when repayment is finally 
due. 
[25] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Property and Water 
Rights.-A provision in a contract between an irrigation dis-
trict and the United States for construction of a distributing 
system within the district that the United States may acquire 
property within the district in its own name for the purpose 
of constructing such system and that the United States may 
divest itself of ownership only in such manner as may be 
provided by Congress, is contrary to the debtor-creditor rela-
tionship existing between the United States and the district 
in view of the district's right, upon final repayment, to con-
veyance of the property not dependent on any future act of 
Congress. 
[26a-26c] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Property and 
Water Rights.-No limitation may be placed on the power of 
the United States to sell and convey its own lands, but in 
distributing water contracted to be delivered to an irrigation 
district the United States does so as a purveyor of water at 
a price for the benefit of water users of the district and, in 
so delivering water to the district, it is not competent for 
the United States or the district to discriminate against pres-
ent or potential water users in the district on the basis of the 
amount of land owned by them, and the 160-acre limitation 
contained in the original Reclamation Act of 1902 (32 Stats., 
p. 388) is inapplicable to the subject matter of a contract 
entered into by such district with the United States, by which 
the United States undertakes to deliver water from the Central 
Valley Project to the district and to expend funds for the 
construction of a distribution system within the district. 
[27] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-Dis-
crimination among water users in an irrigation district is 
expressly contrary to state law. (Wat. Code, § 22250.) 
[28] Constitutional Law-Equal Protection of Laws-Classifica-
tion.-Although a law is general and constitutional when it 
applies equally to all persons embraced in a class founded on 
some natural or intrinsic or constitutional distinction, it is 
not general or constitutional if it confers particular privileges 
or imposes peculiar disabilities or burdensome conditions, in 
the exercise of a common right, on a class of persons arbi-
trarily selected from the general body of those who stand in 
precisely the same relation to tlH' subjPct of thP law. 
[29] Waters-Contracts Pertaining to Water Rights-Validity.-
'l'he extent of the right of an owneT of real propeTty to the 
Jan.1957] IvANHOE IRR. DrsT. v. ALL PARTIES 
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use and enjoyment of his property including the water 
right which may be attached thereto, cannot be constitu-
tionally limited on the sole basis of the amount of property 
he owns, especially with reference to property of the same kind 
and similarly situated. 
[30] !d.-Contracts Relating to Water Rights-Validity.-The 
owner of a property right which is or may be appurtenant to all 
of his land suitable for irrigation cannot be limited in the 
enjoyment of that right to 160 acres of his larger holdings; 
the same right should attach to his lands in excess of 160 
acres and to the excess lands of all those similarly situated. 
[31] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-
Though W at. Code, § 23200, provides that under contracts 
between an irrigation district and the United States with rela-
tion to the right to use water acquired by the district the 
water "shall be distributed and apportioned by the district 
in accordance with the applicable acts of Congress," the owners 
of irrigable lands and water users within the district are not 
subject to the 160-acre limitation contained in the Federal 
Reclamation Act of 1902, since Wat. Code, § 23200, contem-
plates that "applicable" federal law shall apply, and the 160-
acre limitation is inapplicable where title to the water to be 
purveyed is not an unlimited title in the United States since 
it is holding such title as trustee for the water users. 
[32a, 32b] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-
lnsofar as a contract between an irrigation district and the 
United States provides for furnishing water to the district 
for a price, the United States in acting as a purveyor of domes-
tic waters of the state to the district is bound to observe and 
comply with state laws with reference to the rights vested 
in the water users being served or entitled to be served, and 
in this respect neither the state nor any of its agencies may 
contract or otherwise provide that the distribution of water 
to those for whose benefit the right to the water was acquired 
may be arbitrarily discontinued. 
[33] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-A 
provision of the Reclamation Act of 1902 (32 Stats., p. 388) 
that "Nothing in this act shall be construed as affecting or 
intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws 
of any state ... relating to the control, appropriation, use or 
distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right 
acquired thereunder and the Secretary of the Interior in carry-
ing out the provisions of this act, shall proceed in conformity 
with such laws," controls the operations of the Department 
of Interior so far as federal law is concerned and, under the 
controlling state law, the furnishing of water to consumers 
must be subject to and be in conformity with certain rules 
604 C.2d 
and under the 
of the state. 
[34] Districts--Contracts: Property and Water 
Rights.~To construe contract between an irrigation district 
and the United States and for construction 
of a distribution within the district as imposing on 
the district and landowners a burden under which they might 
suffer the loss of water at the discretion of the United 
States would be to c<mstitutional principles. 
[35] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Confirmation Proceedings-Validat-
ing Acts.-The of a contraet between an irrigation 
distriet and the United States for a water supply and for con-
struction of a distribution system within the district was not 
established by the Second Validating Act of 1949 (Stats. 1949, 
p. 1511), where the contract was not in existence when such 
act was passed, and where it was approved by the electors of 
the district and signed after the Legislature had adjourned, 
though before the effective date of the act. 
[36] Statutes-Validating Acts.-A. validation act assumes legis-
lative consciousness of some act or omission on the part of 
the public body n1Tocted which is designed to he cured or con-
firmed, and after J1nal adjournment of the Legislature and until 
effective date of the act (90 days thereafter) there is no oppor-
tunity for the exercise of this legislative purpose to function. 
[37] Waters-Irrigation Districts-Validating Acts.-If a con-
tract between an irrigation district and the United States for 
a water supply and for construction of a distribution system 
be deemed to include a utility type contract at the option of 
the United States, the Second Validating Aet of 1949 (Stats. 
1949, p. 1511) or any validating act of a similar character could 
not render such contract valid, since the Legislature may ratify 
only what it could have theretofore authorized, and it could 
not by a general ratifying statute breathe validity into a con-
tract the effect of which would be to avoid all laws of the 
state, both constitutional and statutory, respecting the regu-
lation and control of publie utilities. 
(38] Public Utilities-Regulation.-Assuming the Legislature's 
plenary power to enact laws respecting the regulation and 
control of public utilities notwithstanding any constitutional 
provision to the contrary (Canst., art. XII, § 22), nevertheless 
such legislation must appear on its face to be cognate and 
germane to the regulation of public utilities. 
[39] Id.-Regulation.-There being nothing on the face of the 
Second Validating Act of 1949 (Stats. 1949, p. 1511) to indi-
cate that it relates to the regulation and control of public 
utilities, it is ineffective to circumvent the laws of the state 
requiring regulation and control of activities which are in all 
essential respects those of a public utility. 
Jan. 1957] IvANHOE lRR. DisT. v. ALL PARTIES 
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Waters-Irrigation Districts-Property and Water Rights.-
When a purveyor of domestic waters of state furnishes 
water to lands for irrigation 
a vested 
for a contract 
between the district and the United 
!d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts.--A in a con-
tract between an district and the States pur-
porting to condition the delivery of water to a landowner other-
wise entitled to delivery on him of any assessment 
levied, though judicially declared to a void assessment, 
may be taken as a reasonable and additional assurance of 
reimbursements to the United States for incurred 
on behalf of the district and to 
furnishing water to the 
legitimate subject of contract. 
APPEAIJS from a judgment of the 
County. Benjamin C. Jones, Ju(\ge.* 
Court of Tulare 
Affirmed. 
Proceeding by an irrigation district to obtain confirmation 
of a contract entered into by it with the United States, by 
which the United States undertook to deliver \Yater from the 
Central Valley Project to the district and to expend funds for 
the construction of a distribution system within the district. 
,Judgment for objecting defendants, affirmed. 
E. I. Peemster, James R McBride, Ralph l\1. Brody, Ed-
mund G. Brown, Attorney General, B. Abbott Goldberg and 
Adolphus Moskovitz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appel-
lants. 
Roy A. Gnstafson, District Attorney (Yentura), James E. 
Dixon, Deputy Distriet Attorney, J. J_~ee Rankin, Solicitor 
General of the United Statrs, Perry \Y. Morton, Assistant At-
torney General, DaYid R \Varner anll P. Marquis, 
Attomcys, Department of Jnstie(~. as Amiei Cmiae on behalf 
of Appellants. 
*Assigned by Chairman of .Judicial Connell. 
tHeportcr's Note: '!'he for the Feden!l 
tiee participated in the trial ns Amiei 
of the plaintiff distrid. 'l'hey no briefs aJl(l did 
participate on appeal Pxcept that as Amici Curiae the;-




1iler1 a memo· 
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Horton & Knox, Harry W. Horton, M. 1:\. Bailey, W. R. 
Bailey, Henry Holsinger, Principal Attorney, Division of 
Water Resources, and Gavin M. Craig, Senior Attorney, for 
Respondents. 
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Herman Phleger, Alvin J. 
Rockwell, ,John lVL Naff, Jr., Edson Abel, Sherwood Green 
and Green, Green & Bartow as Amici Curiae on behalf of Re-
spondents. 
SHENK, J.-'rhe plaintiff Ivanhoe Irrigation District and 
certain of the defendants appeal from a judgment refusing 
to confirm a proposed contract between, the United States, 
acting by and through the Bureau of Reclamation of the 
Department of the Interior, and the district. The contract 
provides for the delivery of a supply of water for irrigation 
purposes from the Central Valley Project and for the con-
struction of a distribution system to make the water available 
for beneficial use on the lands within the district. 
On September 23, 1949, the plaintiff district, purporting 
to act under the Irrigation District Federal Cooperation Law 
(Wat. Code, § 23175 et seq.), entered into the contract with 
the United States. As required by law the contract was 
approved by the California Districts Securities Commission, 
but with reservations (\Yat. Code, §§ 23222 and 24253), and 
by the district's electors (W at. Code, § 23220 et seq). 
[1] This proceeding was commenred by the district on Oc-
tober 31, 1949, in the Superior Conrt in and for the County of 
Tulare to have the contract ronfirmed. Confirmation is re-
quired by federal law (Omnibus ..::\djnstment Act of 1926, 
§ 46, 44 Stats. 649, 650, 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1946), Federal 
Reclamation Laws, Ann. 318-319), by section 42 of the con-
tract and by the Water Code of the State of California 
( § 22670 et seq., § 23225). It is a special proceeding in rem, 
and summons was by publication. It was brought against 
all per:;;ons having or claiming to have an interest in the 
formation of the plaintiff district and in the operation of 
the proposed contract and the lands affected thereby. It 
will fix the :;;tatns of all property within the district lawfully 
affected by the contract and a final judgment will foreclose 
further inquiry into the matters to which the judgment prop-
erly relates. \Vithin its pertinent issues it will be binding 
on tlJC world at largf~. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1908; Becher v. 
IvANHOE IRR. DrsT. v . .ALL PARTIES 
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Contoure 27fJ U.S. 388 [49 S.Ct. 356, 73 L.Ed. 
752] ; Riley v. New York Tntst Co., 815 U.S. 348 [62 S.Ct. 608, 
86 L.Ed. 885] ; see Jlrcnchman-Camln·idge hr. Dist. v. Fergu-
son, 154 Ncb. 20 [46 N.W.2d 6fJ2].) 'rho judgment is limited 
to a determination of the validity of the contract. As neces-
sarily incident thereto questions relating to the title to and 
the control to be exercised over the unappropriated domestic 
waters of the state, to the distribution and sale of those 
waters by the district and to the ownership of the distributing 
system to be acquired by the district, will be considered. 
Originally only two parties appeared as parties defendant, 
the first being the People of the State of California, acting 
by and through the attorney general. The other appearing 
defendant is Courtney McCracken, the owner of 309 acres 
of irrigable land within the district. He filed a demurrer 
on December 13, 1949, and an answer on November 11, 
1950. He is a bachelor and those provisions of the contract 
( §§ 34, 35 and 36) which would limit to a single person the 
ownership of no more than 160 acres of land entitled to the 
distribution of water, particularly are sought to be applied 
to him. He is a nonresident of the district and could not, 
under terms of the applicable law (Wat. Code, § 23220 et seq.) 
vote for or against approval of the contract. He opposes 
confirmation for numerous reasons but particularly on the 
ground that the 160-acre limitation hereinafter considered 
is not applicable and is invalid as to him and his property 
within the district . 
.A default was entered against everyone not appearing 
within the time specified in the published notice of service. 
'l'he United States did not formally appear but caused the 
Regional Counsel and .Assistant Regional Counsel of the 
Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior 
to request permission to appear as amici curiae. Objection 
to such an appearance was interposed by the then attorney 
general on the ground that the United States was a party 
interested in the proceeding and should appear as such. The 
objection was overruled and the request granted. Federal 
counsel thus appeared and took part in the proceedings 
throughout the trial. 
The State Engineer is Chief of the Division of Water 
Resources of the Department of Public Works and pursuant 
to law has exercised the duties imposed upon the Water Com-
608 "\LL C.2d 
mission. 1 
trial eourt, but al that tinw 1hc on its own motion, set 
aside the default or the State and he appeared and 
(·Omlst~l as he had the right to do. 
11041.) He stated Hmt his interest in the 
was 10 the state water law from impair-
ment, aml that in the event the court saw fit to validate the 
contrad he 1he court to confirm what he claimed to 
be established state law relating to the title of the state's 
\Yater resources and regulations pertaining thereto. The 
relief which he seeks will be hereinafter noted. 
Counsel Jor the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation, the owner 
of large areas of irrigated and irrigable lands in the San 
,Joaquin iu and out of the district, appeared as amici 
curiae and participated in the trial in opposition to confirma-
tion of the contract. 
The petition sets forth the essential facts as a basis for 
the request for confirmation. 'fhe prayer is that the court 
examine and enquire into the proceedings for the organization 
of the distriet and the validity of the contract, and that a 
judgment be entered confirming· those proceedings and the 
eontract. A copy of the proposed contract is attached to the 
petition and made a part thereof. 
On Deeember 13, 1949, the attorney general filed a general 
and special demurrer on behalf of the state in which he at-
tacked the validity of the contract sought to be confirmed. 
Before the drmnrrcr was ruled upon and on November 8, 
1950, he filed an ans>ver reiterating as defensive matter the 
position taken in the demurrer, which >vas (1) that the 
proposed contract would be an unconstitutional delegation 
of the legislatiw pmver of California to Congress, to the 
Secretary of the Interior, and to the district, acting jointly; 
(2) that certain land limitation provisions of the Reclama-
tion Laws which the contract purports to apply within the 
district are not applicable to the land within the district; (3) 
that the contract uneonstitntionally deprives owners of excess 
land of property without due process of law; ( 4) that the 
Irrigation District Federal Cooperation Law of the State 
of California, under 1vhich the district purports to proceed, 
violates the Constitution and laws of the State of California 
1 Under the provisions of A.B. 4, ch. G2, l!lGG l~irst Extra Sess., 
effective July G, lDGG, these duties, with tho exception of supervision 
of water distribution, were trnnsforrer1 to the now State Water Rights 
Board, and the new Director of the Department of Water Resources 
assumed the functions of the Water Resources Board. 
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laws may be 
not authorized federal law. 
of state was that a be entered 
take the petition; that a declara-
the and duties among themselves of 
the State of the United States, the plaintiff Dis-
trict and the landowners therein with respect to the contract, 
and for all other proper relief. 
On March 7, 1951, in open the general 
leave to withdraw the original answer of the State 
of California and to file an amended answer. Permission 
granted and the amended answer was filed on March 
1951, seeking the confirmation of the contract. 
The filing of the amended answer occurred after conferences 
and correspondence between the state's representatives and 
the Secretary of the Interior. In his letter of March 5, 1951, 
the Secretary of the Interior stated that questions "with 
respect to the historical, present and future ownership of 
>Yater or water rights" would seem "to be immaterial to the 
question whether a particular contract for water service or 
for the construction of a distribution system, or both, is a 
valid one and to the question of the authority of the district 
to enter into it"; that he did not believe "that a finding that 
the contractual obligations are valid is determinative of the 
title of the water", and that the question "whether an in-
dividual water user, or a district may have a legal right to 
demand the continual delivery of project water after the 
expiration of the 40 year term of a water service clearly is not 
affected by a finding that the contract of itself is binding 
during its own express term." 
In response to the letter of March 5, 1951, the attorney 
general replied, under date of l\Iarch 22, 1951, that "It is 
my view that this contract is not intended to and does not 
deal with, determine, or settle any questions with respect 
to the historical, present or future claims of ownership of 
water or water rights that are now or may hereafter be 
urged by the United States, the State of California, the 
Ivanhoe Irrigation District, or individual or corporate land-
owners or users of the water, the furnishing of which is 
provided for by the said contract.'' 
To the letter of March 22, 1951, the Secretary of the In-
terior replied under date of March 27, 1951, in which he 
agreed with the attorney general that the ownership of water 
47 C.2d-20 
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or water the r~ontrad or by 
the validation He eonelnclcd that it won1(1 follow 
that vvater will be :,mpplied pursuant to appropriatiom; filed 
by the United States, ions file<1 t1w state and as-
signed to the l;nited States, and rights by contract 
and othenvisc from private illC1ividuals and corporations; that 
as to such water, the United States will contraet only to furnish 
a supply and to be paid for services rendered; that the con-
tracts will not and will not purport to affect the ownership 
of the water or rights thereto, and that the owiJership of 
water or water rights by a water district or a landowner 
therein will be no different than had the supply been furnished 
by the Water Project Authority of the state. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing the allegations of paragraphs 
VI and VIII of the original answer on behalf of the state 
and the same numbered paragraphs of the amended answer 
in effect remainell the same. Paragraph VI of the amended 
answer alleges that the State of California, acting through 
its Department of Finance, pursuant to state law, previously 
filed with the Division of ·water Resources of the Department 
of Public \Vorks of California certain applications for the 
appropriation of the unappropriated waters of the Sacra-
mento and San Joaquin Rivers and their tributaries for the 
use and benefit of the Central Valley Project and the owners 
of lands to he irrigated therefrom; that by assignments, made 
pursuant to statute, the State of California, again acting 
through its Department of Finance, assigned to the United 
States for the use and benefit of the Central Valley Project 
certain of those applications. 
Paragraph VIII of the state's amended answer alleges 
that by virtue of the terms of the applications, the state has 
become and is the trustor of an express trust; that by the 
assignments the United States has become and is the trustee 
of that trust; that the landowners to be served from the 
works of the Central Valley Project, including the land-
owners of plaintiff district, have become and are the benefi-
c-iaries of that trust; that any and all claims or interests of 
the United States obtained by the proposed contract are held 
by the United States as such trustee as a part of a trust 
corpus or res for the use and benefit of the Central Valley 
Project and the landowners to be served water from the works 
of that project, ancl in particular the landowners of plaintiff 
District; that the State of California is entitled to be heard, 
among other things, as to all matters relating to the ad-
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ministration and execution of the trust by the United States 
aud is entitled to require that the trustee administer the 
trust according to its true intent and meaning. 
However in apparent furtherance of the understanding 
between the attorney general and the Secretary of the In-
terior it was alleged in paragraph XI of the amended an-
swer that the validity of the contract "does not depend on 
whether the United States has rights to the water to be 
delivered by it pursuant to the contract or rights to the use 
thereof or title or ownership thereto; ... that an adjudica-
tion of such rights to water or the use thereof or title or 
ownership thereto is not appropriate in this proceeding, and 
that such an adjudication herein would be contrary to the 
best interests of the State and of the United States." Copies 
of correspondence between the Secretary of the Interior and 
the attorney general, including the letters above referred to, 
were attached as exhibits to the amended answer. 
The prayer of the amended answer is "(1) that the dis-
trict's legal capacity and authority to enter into the contract, 
the proceedings on the part of the district for the authoriza-
tion of the execution of the contract, and the execution of 
the contract between the I van hoe Irrigation District and the 
United States be confirmed and declared valid; and (2) that 
the decree in this proceeding recite that on the issues prop-
erly raised in this proceeding the decree is not required to and 
does not purport to be an adjudication of the right or interest 
of the State of California or of its agencies, including but 
not limited to the I van hoe Irrigation District and the Water 
Project Authority, or of the right or interest of the United 
States or its agencies, or all or any of the above, in or to the 
waters or water rights or respecting the regulation of the 
use thereof under the laws of the State of California, involved 
in the Central Valley Project. 
"AND WHEREFORE, the \Vater Project Authority which is 
not taking any position on the validity of the contract between 
the Ivanhoe Irrigation District and the United States, prays 
that the decree in this proceeding recite that on the issues 
properly raised in this proceeding the deeree is not required 
to and does not purport to be an adjudication of the right or 
interest of the State of California or of its agencies including 
but not limited to the Ivanhoe Irrigation District and the 
\Vater Project Authority, or of the right or interest of the 
United States or its agencies, or any or all of the above, in 
or to the waters or water rights or respecting the regulation 
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of the 
involved in the Central 
On the set for 
that the district 
of the Water 
that the 
the default of the 
The Authority 
joint answer served as the amemkd answer 
California, heretofore set out in and the 
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Authority. The latter assumed a neutral attitude so far as 
the Yalidity of the contract was and that 
a decree issue the rights of the parties but not pur-
porting to adjudicate the or interest in or to water or 
\.Yater rights or or nse thereof under 
the laws of the state. The principal for the Division 
of \Vater Resources of the Department of Public \Vorks 
appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the \Vater Project 
Authority. 
The trial of the case insofar as the taking of evidence was 
concerned took place on April 3, 1951. 'rhe reeorc1 consists of 
documentary evidence and other matters of which the court 
may take judicial notice. There are no questions of 
fact. Briefing in the trial court was extensiYe and oral argu-
ment was not presented until more than a year later. The 
findings of fact and conclusions of law \vere and judg-
ment was entered on Fehrnary 27, 1953, denying confirma-
tion of the contract on numerous grounds. [3] Under the 
statute if the contract fails of confirmation on one material 
ground it must fail of confirmation as a whole. (See ·wat. Code, 
§ 22680.) However, as the trial eonrt refused confirmation 
on many more than one must be rnled upon for the 
guidance of the trial court in possible further proceedings. 
[4] The judgment contained injunctive orders prohibiting the 
district from refusing or failing to supply to the defendant 
Courtney McCracken water for irrigating purposes for all 
of his lands within the district and in from proceed-
ing under the contract. Since the judgment declaring the 
invalidity of the contract must be affirmed. the injunctive 
provisions may be NeithrJ' t1JO~c provisions nor 
anytldng herein should he taken as prohibiting the eontraeting 
parties from renegotiating a nrw contract or from continuing 
the distribution of water pending such negotiations. 
Jan. 
state have 
IvANHOE IRR. DrsT. v. ALL PARTIES 613 
824] 
the 
and on March 17 by the 
State of California and the \Vater Project 
State of California. 'l'he district and the 
briefs have been filed by 
McCracken the judgment 
who seeks a dec-
water rights under 
status of the state in relation to water 
the status of the United States as 
trustee for the benefit of the project water users, and the 
cocct.uvu of certain provisions of the federal Reclama-
tion Aets of 1902 and 1939 hereinafter referred to. 
Amici curiae briefs in support of the judgment have been 
filed by the California l<'arm Bureau Federation and the 
Di Giorgio Pruit Corporation. An amicus curiae brief has 
been filed by the Ventura County F'lood Control District, 
which does not attack the judgment as to the invalidity of 
the contract but contends that the court's conclusion of law 
to the effect that the water rights involved are appurtenant 
to the lands upon which the water is now used or is to be 
used, is not in accordance with existing law. The federal 
government is not a party to the appeal but it is apparent 
that its attitude is reflected in the position of the attorney 
general, particularly \vith reference to the 160-acre limitation 
hereafter di1>cussed. There is no disagreement on the part 
of any party appearing as to the correctness of the judgment 
of the trial court that the title to and control over the unappro-
priated domestic waters of the state are vested in the state 
in trust for the water users of the state. 
The questions raised in this case cannot be answered without 
reference to the nature and character of the title to the water 
rights involved. Closely related thereto and in part deter-
minative thereof arc the efforts put forth by the state in aid 
of the development of its water resources for the benefit of 
the people of the state, which efforts finally resulted in part 
in the Central Valley Project. From the beginning it was 
realized that the growth and development of the state, from 
the standpoint of agriculture, industry, population and gen-
eral welfare, required sources of water supply in addition to 
the annual rainfall and underground supplies. This was 
especially true in the vast arid or semi-arid sections of the 
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of the Saeramento 
and San ,Joaquin Hivees. 
Authorization to inquire into the problem \vas provided for 
as early as 1850. (Stats. 1850, p. 256.) These efforts were 
repeated in 1878 (Stats. 1878, p. 634), in 1911 (Stats. 1911, 
p. 822), in 1D13 by the adoption of the Water Commission 
Act (Stats. 1913, p. 1012), and in 1915 (Stats. 1915, p. 514). 
In 1921 a state-wide conservation plan study \vas authorized 
(Stats. 1921, p. 1685) and reports thereon were made to the 
Legislature in 1923 in Public vVorks Bulletins Numbers 4, 
5 and 6. In 1923 the Legislature failed to furnish funds for 
further studies and money was provided by the Chambers of 
Commerce of Los Angeles and San Francisco for that purpose. 
A further report was made in 1925 in Public \Vorks Bulletin 
Number 9. This report emphasized the needed coordinated 
development in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys. 
In 1925 the Legislature provided for further studies and 
reports (Stats. 1925, p. 1013) ·which were made to the Legis-
lature in 1927 by Public Works Bulletins Numbers 12, 13, 14, 
15 and 16. These reports also emphasized the needed coordi-
nated development in the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys. 
Following these reports the Legislature in 1927 (Stats. 1927, 
p. 508) deemed it advisable to provide for the appropriation 
within the provisions of the then \Vater Commission Act e>f 
all of the unappropriated waters of the various streams of 
the state which might be needed for the coordinated plan of 
conservation in the central valleys. It was under this author-
ization that the Director of Finance, beginning in 1927, filed 
some 37 applications on behalf of the state on streams within 
the central valley area, some of which were intended for the 
storage of water in the Friant Reservoir of the San Joaquin 
River and the construction of the proposed main canal south-
erly therefrom through the area of plaintiff district. Several 
of these filings cover water which is essential to the Central 
Valley Project. 
As the result of the prolonged studies and planning by the 
state, the Legislature in 1933 enacted a statute designating 
the Sacramento-San Joaquin coordinated project as the 
Central Valley Project, and created the Water Project Au-
thority as an agency of the state to construct, operate and 
cover the cost of the project, estimated at $170,000,000. (Stats. 
1933, p. 2643.) The units and works to constitute the Project 
were defined in the statute. They included, among other 
works, Friant Dam and the Friant-Kern Canal to conduct 
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water to and through the Ivanhoe area. That act is now 
contained in sections 11100-11830 of the ·water Code.2 
The Central Valley Project Act authorized the issuance 
and sale of $170,000,000 in revenue bonds. But in those days 
of depression and unemployment, such bonds were of doubtful 
or uncertain financial favor so far as the investing public 
was concerned. At any rate they were not sold and the 
state turned to the federal government for financial assistance. 
The problem then confronting the state was simply one of 
money. It is an undeniable fact that the State of California, 
without federal or other outside assistance, could have fol-
lowed through with its plans for the development of the 
Central Valley Project if it had had the money with which 
to do it. The state was well equipped with an engineering 
staff and other expert assistance in its Department of Public 
\Vorks, Division of ·water Resources, to construct and 
operate necessary works and facilities to do all that has been 
done by the United States. All that was needed was the 
money available through state channels and expendable under 
the authority of the state alone. The Legislature contem-
plated and required that the Water Project Authority "pro-
ceed with the construction of the project immediately upon 
funds being available therefor" (Wat. Code, § 11452) and 
that the Authority have ''full charge and control of the 
construction, operation, and maintenance of the Project and 
the collection of all rates, charges and revenues from it'' 
(Wat. Code, § 11451). 
The studies of California water problems by the Board 
of Public Works through the State Engineer pursuant to 
legislative authority beginning in 1921 and extending over 
a ten-year period at state expense were far-reaching. They 
have been characterized as ''the most comprehensive and 
thoroughgoing set of studies instituted by a state agency 
looking to the development of its natural resources.'' (History 
of Legislation and Policy Formation of the Central Valley 
Project, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics [1946].) The report based on these studies (Pub-
lic Works Bulletin 25, Report to Legislature of 1931 on 
State Water Plan) was officially approved by the I1egislature 
2 An overall state water plan, entitled "The California Water Plan," 
was undertaken by the Director of Water Resources and a preliminary 
report was issued entitled "Report on the California Water Plan, Pre-
liminary Edition," State Water Resources Board, Bull. No. 3, May, 
1956." 
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in 1941. (Stats. 
mittedly the Central 
§ 10001.) Ad-
the result of the 
planning, Reclama-
tion, but it is 
of Interior to be the creature of the state. This is shown 
by the testimony of the Commissioner of 
relation to the 's 1948 
follows: "The 1s 
also necessary to understand this This project has 
been a dream of over half a century in California. The Bu-
reau of Reclamation did not start this It has been 
made the agent for completing it." (Hearings before the 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House 
of Representatives, Eightieth Congress, First Session on the 
Interior Department Appropriation Bill for 1948, p. 723.) 
Faced with lack of state funds sufficient to finance such 
an extensive enterprise application was made to the United 
States for loans or grants of federal funds sufficient to 
construct the initial units of the project. The loans soughi 
were to be secured by the revenue bonds of the Projrct 
Authority authorized by the Central Valley Project Act. 
Although the engineering feasibility and the need for the 
project were recognized by the Financial Division of the 
Public Works Administration, and several other federal 
agencies reported favorably on the project, the economic 
soundness of the project was questioned and efforts along 
these lines were terminated. However, in 1935 the project 
was referred to the Bureau of Reclamation of the Depart-
ment of the Interior for study. In the report of the Secre-
tary of the Interior to the President on the 26th of November, 
J 935 (Booklet of Information for Conferences Brtween U .S. 
Dept. of the Interior and Water Project Authority of thE' 
State of California [Aug. 28,1940], p. 16), on the feasibility 
of the project it is stated: "The next declaration required 
iR that the cost of construction will probably be returnE-d 
to tlw Federal Government. This is interpreted to mean 
that it will be returned within forty years from the time the 
Secretary issues public notice that water is avallable from 
thE' Project works. The estimated cost of construction is 
$170,000,000.00 and the annnal cost. including repayment of 
all other charges, is $7,500,000.00. It is rstimntE'd that the 
annual revenues from the sale of water and of rlPetric powrr 
will be sufficient to cover these charges. The favorable con-
ditions herE-tofore recitE-d justify thE' belief that the projE-ct 
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President 
federal reclama-
supra, p. 'rhe 
recommendation of the of the In-
later reduced to $4,200,000 
under the Helie£ .1\ppropriation Act of 1935, to 
initiate construction of the In that same year, with 
the passage of the Hivers and Harbors Act on August 30, 
a direct contribution $12,000,000 from federal funds 
was authorized for the construction of Kennett (now Shasta) 
Dam. ( U. S. Stats., 49 Stats., p. 1038.) Thereafter Congress 
regularly made funds available to the Bureau of Reclama-
tion for the construction of the project, and prior to August 
:n, 1951, a total of $396,987,427 had been appropriated. 
The Bureau of Reclamation established an office in Sacra-
mento and commenced work on the project in 1935. Work 
on the project units including the plaintiff district's unit 
has been continuously prosecuted. It is to be noted that the 
allocations of funds by the federal government were generally 
made with a proviso that such funds were reimbursable in 
accordance with the reclamation laws. (See First Deficiency 
Appropriation Act of 19~l6, June 22, 1986; Booklet of In-
formation, supra, pp. 23, 24, 25, 30, 31.) 
There can be no question but that the Federal Bureau 
of Reclamation and not the "\Vater Project Authority of the 
state has constructed those units of the Central Valley Proj-
ect heretofore completed. But it appears from the foregoing 
and the following that the parties contemplated a state 
project to be eventually owned and operated by the state. 
The "\Vater Project Authority, at the request of the bureau, 
was in close cooperation with the bureau throughout. On 
March 25, 1936, a cooperative contract was executed between 
the United States and the Water Project Authority. This 
was followed by four additional supplemental contracts on 
J\Jarch 13, 1937, November 8, 1937, January 17, 1939, and 
.Tune 30, 1939. These contracts and others executed by the 
state's Department of Public ·works provided, among other 
things, for the performance of certain tasks by the state 
agencies and approval of the Bureau's planning by the 
Authority. The first cooperative contract with the Authority 
contained a special provision as follows: "It is contemplated 
that at the earliest practicable date a contract will be entered 
into between the United States and the Water Project Au-
thority, providing for, but not limited to: (a) The operation 
618 l\'ANUOE lim. Dis'r. v. ALL PAwrws [47 C.2d 
and maintenance by the authority of useful units of the 
project, upon presenting assurance of payment satisfactory 
to the United States of the cost thereof. (b) Appropriate 
payment by the authority to the United States for expendi-
hues in construction of the project.'' In the second and 
third supplemental contracts the special provision was re-
stated in about the same terms. On February 15, 1939, the 
g·overnor of the state addressed a letter to the Secretary of 
the Interior in which he suggested that a contract be entered 
into immediately providing for the administration, operation 
and maintenance of the project by the Authority, and for 
the repayment of the reimbursable costs of the project by 
the Authority to the United States. In answer thereto the 
Secretary of the Interior suggested procedures by which state 
agencies might take over certain facilities. No definite de-
velopments resulted along this line. 
The United States has acquired in its own name rights 
to certain domestic waters of the state. 'rhese rights are to 
waters which are essential to the success of the Central Valley 
Project. No claim is made that such water has been acquired 
for any purpose other than for the use and benefit of the 
project. The nature of the interest or title which the United 
States has acquired is hereinafter referred to. The United 
States owns no lands in the Central Valley, and by express 
provision the acquisition of water rights in most instances 
was for the benefit of the Central Valley Project or units 
thereof. The greater portion of water to which the United 
States has acquired rights is by assignments from the state's 
Director of Finance. (Wat. Code, § 10500 through 10506.) 
Four assignments of applieations for the appropriation of 
unappropriated water of the Sacramento River, totaling 
35,000 second-feet diversion and 12,690,000 acre-feet annual 
storage, were made on September 3, 1938. On September 30, 
1939, three assignments of applications for the appropriation 
of unappropriated water of the San Joaquin River, totaling 
9,500 second-feet diversion and 4,420,000 acre-feet annual 
storage, were made to the United States. Requests for addi-
tional assignments have been made to the Director of Finance 
by the United States. The assignments made were in trust 
for the use and benefit of the Central Valley Project and 
with the necessary reservation that the lando,vners and in-
habitants within a watershed area or other area conveniently 
supplied by the watershed area are not to be depriYed of 
their prior rights to water reasonably required for their 
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beneficial needs. (Wat. Code, §§ 11460 and 11463; see Wat. 
Code, § 11128, as added in 1951 [Stats. 1951, p. 3216].) 
The United States itself, between 1943 and 1952, as origi-
nal applicant, filed eight applications for the appropriation 
of unappropriated vvater totaling 33,810 second-feet diversion 
and 2,646,000 acre-feet annnal storage of domestic waters 
of the state. In all instances these applications were made 
for specific purposes in connection with the Central Vall0y 
Project. 
The United States has also acquired through contract exten-
sive riparian, appropriative and prescriptive water rights in 
the San .Toaqnin Hiv<'r once held by Miller and Lux, Inc. 
"\Vater rights in the area involved have been the subject of 
considerable litigation. (See United States v. Gerlach Live 
Stock Co., 3:39 U.S. 725 [70 S.Ct. 955,94 r~.Ed. 1231]; Eve1·ctt 
G. Rank v. Krur; (U.S.Dist.Ct .. 81Juthcrn Dist. IJ[ Ca7if1Jrnia, 
Northern Div. l{o. 685-N.D.), 142 F.Supp. 1; Hollister Land 
& Cattle Co. v. Kru,c; (U.S.Dist.Court. Sout!lrnt Dist1·ict of 
Califm·nia. Nm·thcn1 Diuision, No. 680-N.n.), [Rank v. J(nrg. 
90 F.Supp. 773, 806].) It is asserted that the United States 
intends to divert some of this water to the Central Valley 
Project. By agreement dated May 24, 1939, between the 
United States and the Madera Irrigation Distriet, tho United 
States acquired assignments of all of the District's applica-
tions to appropriate the \Yater of tho San ,J oaqnin River, 
grants of the Friant Dam site, portions of the reservoir area 
and certain gravel deposits. In addition to the foregoing, the 
United States has acquired, or is in the pror.ess of aequiring, 
the riparian, appropriative and prescriptive water rights of 
hundreds of smaller landowners, all of whom are affeeted by 
the construction of units and the diversion of water for the 
Central Valley Project. 
[5] In view of the foregoing circumstances the trial court 
properly refused to eliminate the issue of title from the case. 
It is obvious that the attorney general of the state and the 
Seeretary of the Interior could not, hy agreement, exclude 
from the proceeding the question of title or ownership of 
water or foreclose other interested parties from pressing it 
as a vital question in the case. There is no itispnte between 
any of tlH~ parties appraring in the litigation as to the nature 
of that title mHl ii is of great importam:e for upon it depends 
the extent to which the state or the Fnit0d States or any party 
dealing with the domestic waters of the state may exercise 
powers of rontrol. 
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State of California or any of 
to be the owner of the title 
it would neeessarily follow 
dominion and eontrol over sueh 
would control. 
if tlw Fnited States the State of California or 
the distribution aml 
as trustee for the henefieiaries of 
of namely the law of trusts, 
The exelnsion of the question of 
title from the ease could be only on the theory that 
without and as a matter of law, the fee simple 
unrestricted tiJlr to the water is in the state or in its assignee, 
the United or in the United States other than by assign-
the elaims of the land O'\Yners in the Dis-
trict as the beneficiaries of trust. Such a theory finds no 
support in the case. 
A trust relationship has existed at all times here in-
volve(), anrl now between the State of California and 
tl1c wah>r nsc>rs of the ine1nding the water users of 
the plaintiff distriet, as to all waters the control of which 
has been red by the state appropriation or purchase. 
As Rtated it is asserted by allegations in the 
pleadings of an of the formally appearing as parties 
defendnnt the State of California, and the existence 
of such a trust relationship is not drmicrl the plaintiff dis-
trict or by any appraring in the proceeding. It is only 
becanse of the position alleged to be asserted by the United 
States that it is vested with absolute ownership in and to the 
water to be distributed to the lands in the district, and to the 
property of the district nscd and usable in the distribution 
of water to lands therein, that the question of title has arisen. 
The question is also important as bearing on the contention of 
the landmvners in the district that the contract would deprive 
them of vested rights without due process of law and without 
just or any compensation. 
In considering the question of the title of the United States 
and of the Stnte of California in and to the domestic water 
of Hw state and the limited measure of control 
whieh may cxereisc OYer thrm, it is well to eonsider 
eertaiu historiea1 of the W'ater law of this state. And 
this may be better nm1erstood by eonsidcring the attitude 
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assumed ihe state m their 
contentions for and un-
restrieted title and dominion to their 
lands to the exclusion of the of the state in administering 
the trust upon it the water law of the state for 
the benefit of other vvater users. 
In the of California the waters of the rivers 
in the llOt'thern section, 
yyere used for and hydraulic the raising of 
domestic and kindred purposes. It was realized 
that water in this semiarid was of utmost importance 
to the ·welfare, progress and prosperity of the people of the 
state. 'l1here were few court decisions on the having 
a ~tatewide significanee prior to the case of Lux v. Ilacmin in 
1886 (69 Cal. 255, 454 [4 P. 919, 10 P. 674] ). At that time 
section 4468 of the Political Code provided as follows: ''The 
eommon law of England, so far as it is not rrpugnant to or 
inconsistent with the constitution of the United States, or 
the constitution or laws o£ the state of California, shall be the 
rule of decision in all the courts of this state.'' This court 
took the general language of that dedaration by its four 
corners and applied the English common-law doctrine of 
riparian rights to the ownership, control and use of the waters 
of the rivers and streams of the state. The doctrine was de-
clared to be that the owner o£ real property bordering such a 
river or stream had a right coexistent with the same rights 
of other landowners on the stream, to the use of its waters 
and the flow thereof as it was "wont to do in the course of 
nature" unimpaired in quality and undiminished in quantity. 
This right was cleelared by this court in Lux v. IIaggin, supra, 
69 Cal. 255, to be a right appurtenant to the land, in fact a 
part and parcel of the land itself. [6] Under this doctrine 
the riparian owner had the right to insist that the full flow of 
the stream continue to pass by his land in its natural state 
whether he needed the water or not. This riparian right 
as so defined was declared by this court to be a property right 
which vested in the owner and as sueh was protected 
by the state and federal Constitutions. It could not be limited 
or impaired without due process of law and without just com-
pensation. rrhe enforcement of that right as so defined led 
to the adoption of the Water Commission Ad of 1913. (Stats. 
1913, p. 1012.) 
By the provisions of that act it was sought, among other 
objectives, to subject the enjoyment of the riparian right to 
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the rule of reasonable beneficial use. Accordingly it was pro-
vided in that act that the use of the waters of the rivers 
and streams oE the state on the part of the riparian owners 
be limited to the \Yater they could reasonably use for beneficial 
purposes and that whatever water remained in the stream flow 
would be subject to reasonable use through appropriation or 
other methods provided by law. 'l'he substance of what the 
Legislature was endeavoring to do was to provide, in the 
exercise of its police power, that the riparian owner could 
continue to have the right to the benefit and enjoyment of 
the waters of the stream both in the present and in the future 
insofar as he was able to put it to beneficial use on his own 
land but that beyond that he could not insist that the water 
flovv by and beyond his land whether he needed it or not. 
Nevertheless this court adhered to the doctrine of Lux v. 
Haggin and by judicial interpretation made ineffective those 
provisions of the "\Vater Commission Act of 1913 designed to 
restrict riparian rights to reasonable beneficial use. In Her-
minghans v. Southern Calif. Edison Co. (1926), 200 CaL 81 
[252 P. 607], the court reannounced its adherence to the 
ancient doctrine and held in effect that no matter how un-
reasonable the claim of a riparian owner to the full flow of a 
stream might be he had the right to assert it. 
Following that decision the Legislature sought to implant 
in the Constitution of the state, and there was subsequently 
incorporated in that document, the provisions of section 3 of 
article XIV, which again declared the policy of the state 
"that the general welfare of the state requires that the water 
resources of the state be put to beneficial use to the fullest 
extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or un-
reasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be 
prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to be 
exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use 
thereof in the interest of the people and for the public 
welfare .... Hiparian rights in a stream or water course at-
tach to, but to no more than so much of the flow thereof as 
may be required or used consistently with this section, for the 
purposes for which such lands are, or may be made adaptable, 
in view of such reasonable and beneficial uses; provided, how-
ever, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as 
depriving any riparian owner of the reasonable use of water 
of the stream to which his land is riparian under reasonable 
methods of diversion and use, or of depriving any appropriator 
of water to which he is lawfully entitled.'' 
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'l'he foregoing amendment to the Constitution as proposed 
by the Legislature in 1927 and adopted in November 1928 
focused the attention of the courts upon the persistent en-
deavor of the people of the state, first through the Legislature 
in 1913 by the adoption of the Water Commission Act in that 
year and then by the constitutional amendment in 1928, to 
put into effect the doctrine of reasonable beneficial use. The 
obvious purpose of the new constitutional provision was to 
invite and urge a judicial declaration that the vested right 
of the riparian owner be subjected to that doctrine. There-
after this court so declared. (Gin Chow v. Santa Barbara 
(1933), 217 Cal. 673 [22 P.2d 5]; Peabody v. City of Vallejo 
(1935), 2 Cal.2d 351 [40 P.2d 486].) [7] Within the scope 
of reasonable beneficial use, vested rights of the riparian owner 
continued to attach to his land as a part and parcel of the 
land itself, and as such was necessarily protected from unlaw-
ful encroachment by both state and federal Constitutions. 
The result is that this vested right as now defined may not 
be destroyed or infringed upon without due process of law 
or without just compensation under either Constitution. 
[Sa] No encroachment on the vested rights of riparian 
owners is directly involved in this proceeding, but the fore-
going observations are pertinent as bearing upon the rights of 
the people of the state, both present and prospective, to avail 
themselves by appropriation or other lawful means of the right 
to the use of waters to which a prior lawful use has not 
attached. In this category the waters here sought to be 
furnished to and used by the landowners in the district must 
be classified. \V e are therefore here directly concerned with 
the title, distribution and use of water which has not hereto-
fore been subjected to beneficial use except as contemplated by 
acquisition, by appropriation or otherwise on the part of the 
State of California and the United States. 
It is thus appPrent that the more recent changes in the 
constitutional and decisional la·w of this state had the effect 
of making available for beneficial uses by appropriation and 
other means great volumes of unappropriated domestic waters 
of the state. The nature of the title to the waters here in-
volved is further indicated by the statutory law of this state. 
The title to these waters was mentioned at an early date in 
the amendment of section 1410 of the Civil Code in 1911 
which provided that ''All water or the use of water within 
the State of California is the property of the people of the 
State of California" subjeet to appropriation and use in the 
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m effect was 
Commission Aet of 1913 
that '' .t'\ll \Vaters in any natural \Yater 
so far as such \Vaters have been 
or are to useful or beneficial purposes, upon, 
or in so far as such waters are or may be reasonably needed 
for beneficial purposes npon lands 
or otherwise is are hereby declared to be 
public >vaters of the state of California alld subject to appro-
priation in aeeordanee with the of this act.'' ( Stats. 
1913, p. 1018.) The same was carried into the 
Water Code in 1943 as section 102. 
Seetion 104 of that code "It is declared 
that the people of the state have a paramount interest in the 
use of the water of the State and that the State shall deter-
mine what water of the State, surface and underground, can 
be converted to public use or controlled for public pro-
tection." Section 105 of the same code provides that "It is 
hereby declared that the protection of the public interrst in 
the development of the water resources of the State is of vital 
concern to the people of tl1e State and that the State shall 
determine in what way the waters of the state, both surface 
and underground, should be developed for the greatest public 
benefit." Section 1052 of that code provides that the diver-
sion or use of water other than as authorized the code is a 
trespass and the Department of Public \Vorks, acting through 
the State Engineer, may initiate actions in the superior court 
to have the trespass enjoined. 
[9] It has long been the established law of the state that 
an irrigation district is trustee for the landowners within the 
district and limited in its trust to receiye and distribute water 
to them. (McTchants Nat. Bank v. Escondido hr. Dist., 144 
Cal. 329 [77 P. 937] ; Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Collins, 154 Cal. 440, 
442 [97 P. 1124] .) In the Merchants Bank case the court 
stated: ''But here, the corporation in question is distin-
guished from ordinary municipal corporations by the fact 
that 'the legal title,' only of the property of the corporation is 
vested in the district, 'in trust for the uses and purposes set 
forth in (the) act'; and that the beneficiaries of the trust-
who, upon familiar equitable principles, are to be regarded 
as the owners of the property-are the landowners in the 
district with whose funds the property has been acquired 
( Civ. Code, § 853) ; and in whom, indeed, is vested by the 
express provisions of the statute, in eaeh, the right to the 
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several use of a definite proportion of the water of the district, 
ancl in in common, the equitable ownership of its water-
rights, ditches, and property generally, as the means 
of supplyiug water. (Stats. 1887, pp. 34, 35 §§ 11, 13.) Such 
rights as these cannot be distinguished in any way from other 
private and therefore elearly come within the protection 
of the of section 13 of article I of the state Con-
stitution that 'no person shall be ... deprived of ... 
property without due process of law,' and of the similar 
provision of Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the 
constitution of the United States." (See also Allen v. H7tssey, 
101 Cal.App.2d 457, 472 [255 P.2d 674] ; Bottoms v. Madera 
Irr·. Dist .. , 74 Cal.App. 681, 702 [242 P. 100]; Colbunt v. 
Wilson, 23 Idaho 337.) 
[10] I.1ikewise the state is not the owner of the domestic 
water of the state in the sense that it has absolute power and 
dominion over it to the exclusion of the rights of those who 
have the beneficial interest therein. The title is an equitable 
one residing in the water users of the state. The state as an 
entity is the holder of the legal title as trustee for the benefit 
of the people of the state, all of whom in the last analysis, 
are the water users of the state. (See Hall v. Superior Court, 
198 Cal. 373, 383 [245 P. 814] : Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Collins, 
154 Cal. 440, 442 [97 P. 1124]; JJ1e1·clwnts Nat. Bank v. Escon-
dido Irr. Dist, supra, 144 Cal. 329.) [11] 'ro avail them-
selves of the right thereto, individually, collectively or in a 
corporate capacity, administrative procedures have been estab-
lished and are set forth in the \Vater Code and related statu-
tory provisions. Compliance with those provisions is neces-
sary in order that the right to use the water may be acquired, 
but always consistent 1vith the trust relationship incident 
thereto. [12] Occupying such a relationship it would be in-
competent for the state to divest itself of the legal title, by 
grant, assignment or otherwise, in any way inconsistent with 
the rights of the beneficiaries. It would necessarily fol-
low that it would be inconsistent with the trust for the state 
to attempt to pass the legal title freed from the trust to any 
third party, including the United States. [13] As trustee 
the state and its agencies, of which the plaintiff district is 
one, are bound faithfully to administer that trust and are 
answerable to the courts, in the exercise of thrir traditional 
powers in equity, for the proper di~>charge of their steward-
ship. They must administer it consistently with and not in 
violation of the rights of the beneficiaries. (2vf er·chants Nat. 
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Bank v. Escondido Irr. Dist., supra, 144 Cal. 329; Lindsay-
Strathmore hr. Dist. v. W1dchumna Water Co., 111 Cal.App. 
688, 698 [296 P. 933]; Allen v. lhtssey, 101 Cal.App.2d 457, 
467 [225 P.2d 674].) [14] But it is not to say that the statc> 
may not in the administration of the trust prescribe or pro-
vide for reasonable terms and conditions to which the bene-
ficiaries must conform in order to have the benefit of expendi-
tures made necessary in providing those benefits. 'l'hese may 
be provided for by statute or, as here, by contracts when duly 
authorized by law. 
The trust relationship existing between the state and the 
beneficiaries of the trust must therefore be kept in mind in 
connection with any transactions between the state or any of 
its agencies and outside parties. [15a] It follows that when 
an outside party, such as the United States, by contract, legis-
lation or otherwise, steps into the shoes of the state to admin-
ister that trust by the development, conservation and distribu-
tion of the trust res, it is bound by the same rules of law as 
surround and govern the State of California or any other 
purveyor of water of the state for the benefit of its water 
users. [16] The state may not therefore lawfully dispossess 
itself of the title to such water and may not surrender its 
control of the same in any way inconsistent with the adminis-
tration of the trust under which the title is held. The state 
by general law may and has in the main prescribed the terms 
and conditions under which the several classes of water users 
may become secure in their right to the water and use thereof. 
[17] The water users of the state whose rights have not 
become vested within the classes above mentioned but who 
are dependent upon an adequate supply of fresh water for 
their existence in the manifold uses to which it may be sup-
plied, have an inchoate right to such uses subject to like 
enforcement and equal protection of the law. This right 
is necessarily dependent upon compliance with reasonable 
rules and regulations attending it and to the circumstances 
of each case such as an adequate water supply, the ability of 
the supplier to furnish the water, reasonable payment for the 
service and perhaps other conditions not necessary to mention 
in the conservation and distribution of a water supply in our 
complex civilization. This inchoate right of present and 
potential water users of the state is a right of which cog-
nizance must be taken in dealing with the general subject 
of the water law of the state and in particular with the rights 
of landowners and water users within the plaintiff district. 
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[18a] It is therefore concluded that the title to the unap-
propriated domestic waters of the state is in the State of Cali-
fornia in trust for the use and benefit of the beneficiaries 
of that trust; that the trust character of that title is anchored 
in the state by constitutional provisions, by statutes enacted 
in furtherance thereof, and by the decisional law of the state; 
that the beneficiaries of that trust are the water users of the 
state vvho in a general sense constitute all of the people of the 
state; that the beneficiaries of the trust relationship whose 
rights are here under consideration are those present or 
prospeetivc users who individually or in properly classified 
groups bring themselves within the orbit of the state law 
under which they may be in position to demand benefits with-
out discrimination, and that within that category are the 
landowners of the district. It is they who are in position to 
avail themselves of the right to beneficial use of the waters to 
be purveyed and to demand indiscriminate service. There is 
nothing in the foregoing declaration which interjects anything 
new into the water law of the state. It is but a recognition 
and redeclaration of existing fundamental concepts of this 
phase of our law. 
It is well to consider at this point the federal law relating 
to the nature of the water rights acquired by the United 
States and affecting the rights of the land owners of the 
district thereunder. The Reclamation Act of 1902 (32 Stats. 
388, 43 U.S.C. § 391) is the basic federal enactment on that 
subject. Under that law and subsequent laws in aid thereof, 
the Bureau of Reclamation is assuming to administer water 
through the Central Valley Project. Section 8 of the Act 
of 1902 provides: '' 'rhat nothing in this Act shall be con-
strued as affecting or intended to affeet or to in any way 
interfere with the laws of any state or territory relating to 
the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used 
in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder and the 
Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this 
Act shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing 
herein shall in any way affect any right of any state or of the 
Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or 
user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or of 
waters thereof; provided, that the right to the use of water 
acquired under tho provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant 
to the land irrigated and beneficial use shall be the basis, the 
measure, and the limit of the right." The meaning and intent 
of section 8 of the Reclamation Act as it specifically applies 
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to the waters involved in the Central has been 
stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Gerlach Live-
stock, Go., supra, 339 U.S. 725. .At pages 734-735 the court 
said : ''Congress proceeded on the basis of full recognition of 
water rights having valid existence under state law. By its 
command that the provisions of the reclamation law should 
govern the construction, operation and maintenance of the 
several construction projects, Congress directed the Secretary 
of Interior to proceed in conformity with state laws, giving 
full recognition to every right vested under these laws. Of. 
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U.S. 40,43 L.Bd. 1289, 1291, 55 
S.Ct. 568] ; California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Pm·tland 
Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 164 [79 L.Ed. 1356, 1364, 55 S.Ct. 
725]; Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 614 [89 L.Ed. 
1815, 1829, 1830, 65 S.Ct. 1332] ; Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Corn., 
302 U.S. 186 [82 L.Ed. 187, 58 S.Ct. 283] .... We think it 
clear that throughout conception, enactment and subsequent 
administration of the plan, Congress has recognized the prop-
erty status of water rights vested unc\er California law. The 
governing water law of California is now derived from a 1928 
amendment to its Constitution ... '' (Art. XIV, § 1) " ... 
to which,'' as the Supreme Court in the Gerlach ease said, 
"the Federal Reclamation .Act defers." (See also United 
States v. Rio Gmnde Dam & I1·r. Go., 174 U.S. 690 [19 S.Ct. 
770, 43 L.Ed. 1136] ; State of Oonnectie1d v. Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 [51 S.Ct. 286, 75 L.Ed. 602] .) 
[19] Thus the federal government both by legislation and 
court decision has recognized that the law of this state is 
determinative of rights to water in this state. This court also 
so held in Peabody v. City of Valle.io, 2 Cal.2d 351, at page 
366 [ 40 P.2d 486]. 
[20a] We therefore feel free to declare that in all transac-
tions between the United States and the State of California or 
its agencies such as the plaintiff district, the parties are 
dealing with trust property held by the state or by those who 
have acquired rights to it from the state or otherwise for the 
benefit of the real owners thereof. They are the present and 
prospective water users of the state who may become entitled 
thereto under the laws of the state. ·whatever interest or title 
the United States has acquired to water by appropriation, 
assignment or by other means of acquisition in furtherance of 
the execution of its trust relationship with the water users 
of the state is necessarily subject to the limitations of title 
herein determined. 
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It is to be observed that we are not here dealing with all 
of the problems incident to the relationship of the state and 
its agencies and the federal government in the construction, 
maintenance, control and operation of the works for the dis-
tribution and use of the domestie waters of the state. We are 
not here conrerned with the ownership and control of inter-
state \Vaters or any other waters coming within well recog-
nized federal control. (Sec Ji'edemZ Power Corn. v. State of 
Oregon 1955), 349 U.S. 435 [75 S.Ct. 832, 99 L.Ed. 
1215] . ) \V e are not concerned with problems attending the 
title, sale, distribution and use of water in the development of 
government 0\Vned land for there are no federally owned irri-
gable lands within the plaintiff district. Nor are we concerned 
with questions relating to the sale and distribution of water 
by a privately owned public utility, nor with the distribution 
and sale of electrical energy developed through or by means 
Gf storage facilities constructed by the State of California or 
by the United States or both. vVe are here concerned only 
with questions of the title, sale and distribution of intrastate 
or domestic waters and with the title to the distributing system 
and facilities acquired for the specific purpose of irrigating 
the lands within the plaintiff district. 
vVe now turn to the provisions of the contract in contro-
versy. Considered in connection with the legislation surround-
ing it, both federal and state, the contract is an instrument 
which, from the standpoint first of its fiscal provisions, pro-
vides in Part B for the construction by the United States of a 
distributing system within the district for a specified consid-
eration payable to the United States in 40 equal annual 
installments; and in Part A to furnish to the district and 
by it to the owners of irrigable lands within the district a 
supplementary supply of domestic waters of the state devel-
oped through the construction and operation of the Central 
Valley Project at a price per acre foot payable annually. The 
concept of repayment to the United States for its costs is the 
unmistakable theme throughout the entire transaction. 
[21a] In entering into -the contract the parties are dealing 
within statutory authorization but at arm's length. It is not 
oversimplification to state that the relationship of the parties 
so far as constrnrtion work is concerned is that of debtor 
and creditor, for it is clear beyond question that they and 
the law under which thc•y are operating contemplate that when 
the money expended by the United States has been repaid by 
the r1istriet or on its behalf. the district is entitled to an 
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acquittance and will thereby become the owner of the distri-
bution system and all of the property used and useful in the 
maintenance and operation thereof free and clear of any claims 
of others, to the same extent as if the district had constructed 
the distributing system itself with its own funds and had thus 
become the owner in trust for the water users within the 
district. [22] As stated it is certainly true that it was 
within the power of the district under the laws of this state 
to do in the first instance all that the United States is obligat-
ing itself to do under the contract with reference to the con-
struction of a distributing system. The district was authorized 
to obtain funds for that purpose by borrowing from the United 
States with or without the issuance of irrigation district bonds 
(Wat. Code, §§ 23280-23289) and it could contract for the 
payment for water distributed to it by or through an outside 
source at a fixed point of delivery upon the payment of the 
charges agreed upon from funds of its own, if available. (Wat. 
Code, § 22228.) In essence, therefore, we have here one party 
agreeing to provide the funds for construction work and un-
dertaking to furnish water at a definite delivery point, and 
the other party agreeing to accept the water at that point with 
payment therefor at a fixed rate and repayment of the con-
struction charges in installments within 40 years, coupled with 
what appears to be all sufficient assurances of security in the 
event of nonpayment. \Vithin the compass of those provisions 
there can be no doubt of the right and power of the parties 
to lawfully contract. 
Included in the assurance of payment according to the 
contract are obligations on the part of the district to provide 
funds for repayment by taxation of the lands within the 
district, by assessments against the lands for that purpose 
and the fixation of water charges sufficient to provide the 
security required by the United States. [23] It is the right 
of the United States to demand that assurances of security 
for repayment of monies advanced by it be included in the 
contract; and provisions to that effect are ine:luded therein. 
The contract goes further and provides that upon default 
in payments as they become due the United States shall 
have the right to take over the operation of the affairs of 
the district in order to assure timely and adequate repayment. 
[24] Likewise, it is the right and duty of the district to have 
included in the contract provisions for adequate clearance 
of its obligations to repay, including the designation therein 
of the amount expended or to be expended hy the United 
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States for the benefit of the district and its landowners, or 
to a workable provision therein as to how the amount advanced 
by the United States may be ascertained when the time for 
final accounting, repayment and acquittance arrives, together 
with the designation of a definite time when repayment is 
finally due. The present contract does not with certainty set 
forth such fiscal matters, particularly as it relates to repay-
ment for the construction of the major storage facilities from 
which water will be delivered to the district. Upon repayment 
the district would succeed to whatever title to lands, structures 
or works acquired by the United States within the district 
in aid of its activities on behalf of the district and the land-
owners within the district, in like manner and to the same ex-
tent as an ordinary debtor is entitled to a satisfaction of 
record evidencing the payment of his indebtedness.3 (See 
Owl Cr·eek Irr. Dist. v. Bryson, 71 Wyo. 30, at pp. 69-70 [253 
P.2d 867, 258 P.2d 220].) 
[25] Although the relationship of debtor and creditor is 
clearly established on the record, it is not clear in what way 
the district and its landowners may become free of indebted-
ness upon repayment. For example, it is provided in the 
contract that the United States may acquire property within 
the district in its own name for the purpose of constructing 
the distributing system, and that pursuant to an act of Con-
gress authorizing such acquisition of property for the benefit 
of the landowners of the district, the United States may 
divest itself of ovvnership only in such manner as may be 
provided by Congress. Obviously such a provision in the 
agreement is contrary to the debtor-creditor relationship exist-
ing between the United States and the district. The right 
and obligation on the part of the United States would seem 
to be to hold the property thus acquired by it in its own name 
only until final repayment is made, with the right of the 
district to a conveyance thereof not dependent on a future 
and necessarily discretionary act of Congress. 
However, it is mainly because the contract includes pro-
visions not relating to its fiscal aspects that the defendant 
3In an obvious attempt to correct the uncertainty in contracts entered 
into pursuant to existing reclamation law, recent legislation by Congress 
has defined in greater detail the allocation of payments for water service 
between operation, maintenance and construction costs of reclamation 
projects. (Pub. L. No. 643, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (3) (July 2, 1956), 
70 U.S. Stat. 483-484 (1956).) Such legislation, of course, was not in 
effect at the time the present contract was entered into and the judg-
ment herein entered. 
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landowner, the State J~ngineer 
Water Resources of the Department of Public 
amici curiae are opposing it. 
C.2d 
On behalf of the state, the attorney general first directs 
his attack upon that portion of the judgment which holds 
the 160-acre limitation of the contract void as applied to the 
state, to the district and to the owners of irrigable land within 
the district. The genesis of the 160-acre limitation is found 
in the original Heclamation Act of ,J nne 17, 1902, heretofore 
referred to. ( 32 Stats., p. 388.) That act is entitled "An 
act appropriating the receipts from the sale and disposal of 
public lands in certain States and 'rerritories to the construc-
tion of irrigation works for reclamation of arid lands.'' 
It is relatively a brief enactment. It occupies less than 
three pages of the Statutes at I1arge of the 57th Congress. 
Section 1 provides that all moneys received from the sale 
and disposal of public lands in western states should be set 
aside in a special fund known as the ''reclamation fund.'' 
This fund is to be used in the examination and survey for 
and the construction and maintenance of ''irrigation works, 
diversion, and development of water for the reclamation of 
arid and semi-arid lands in the said States and Territories.'' 
Subsequent sections provide that the Secretary of the Interior 
construct appropriate irrigation works; that he may withdraw 
certain public lands from entry, or restore other lands to 
public entry, as such lands are required for irrigation works; 
"that public lands which it is proposed to irrigate by means 
of any contemplated ·works shall be subject to entry only 
under the provisions of the homestead laws in tracts of not 
less than forty nor more than one hundred and sixty acres''; 
that the Secretary may limit the area per entry of such public 
lands to be irrigated; that he shall fix the charges "which 
shall be made per acre upon the said entries, and upon lands 
in private ownership which may be irrigated by the waters 
of the said irrigation project"; that no "right to the use of 
water for land in private ownership shall be sold for a tract 
exceeding one hundred and sixty acres to any one landowner, 
and no such sale shall be made to any landowner unless he be 
an actual bona fide resident of such land"; that the Secretary 
is authorized to use the reclamation fund to accomplish the 
purpose of the act; that when repayments required by the act 
''are made for the major portion of the lands irrigated from 
the waters of any of the works herein provided for, then the 
management and operation of such irrigation works shall pass 
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' except that ''the 
of the reservoirs 
and the works necessary and operation 
shall remain in the Government until otherwise provided by 
Congress,'' and that the may judicial 
the lands necessary to carry out the 
purpose 
It i::; the was originally 10 
years as for in section 10 of the ad. It was in-
creased to 20 yc>an; by the Reclamation Act of 1914. (38 
Stats. 687.) It was changed by the Second Deficiency 
Act of 1924 to an indefinite period determined the produc-
tive pow·er of the land. Stats. 702.) It was again changed 
in 1926 to 40 years by the Interior Department Appropriation 
Act of 1927. (44 Stats. 479.) 
It is readily observed from the provisions of the Reclamation 
Act of 1902 that one of its main purposes was to provide for 
the reclamation of vast areas in the 17 western states and terri-
tories where title to the land was still in the federal government 
as owner, and the development of that land into private owner-
ship was deemed essential to the general welfare in establishing 
homes and small farming enterprises in the great western 
domain. 
As a part of this farsighted plan of the federal government 
it was undoubtedly recognized that the desired result could 
best be accomplished by limiting the amount of land thus to 
be purchased and developed. 'fo justify such a limitation in 
the contract in question, the attorney general points to other 
federal enactments which it is claimed were designed for 
the same purpose and which are claimed to have had the same 
effect. Among these enactments arc the Homestead Act of 
May 20, 1862 (12 Stats. 392) where it was provided that the 
amount of land to be acquired by any one person from the 
federal government should not exceed 160 acres. Again on 
May 10, 1872, the Mines and Mining Act provided for a 
limitation on a mining claim usually running lengthwise on the 
vein of ore. (17 Stats. 91.) 
Another illustration of a limitation placed by the federal 
government on the sale of its publicly owned land is found 
in the Desert Land Act of March 3, 1877 ( 19 Stats. 377), 
where a limitation of 320 acres was placed on a pnrehasc by 
one individual. One of the conditions of purchase of land 
under that act was that the entryman or purchaser provide 
for the water to reclaim the desert Janel. Another illustration 
634 [47 C.2d 
is the Timber and Stone Act of June 3, 1878, where a limita-
tion for purchase by an individual was placed at 160 acres 
(20 Stats. 89). 
[26a] Further research would probably disclose other illus-
trations, but sufficient haye been noted to demonstrate that the 
federal government in all of such instances has exercised its 
power as the owner of the land to be offered for sale. No 
limitation on its po'.ver to sell and convey its own lands existed 
or could properly be asserted. The United States was the 
owner of the fee with all of the rights of proprietorship. It 
could sell or refuse to sell as it pleased. It could and often 
did withdraw such lands from entry or sale. As proprietor 
it could part with its lands under such terms and conditions 
of sale as it saw fit, including a limitation on acreage, price, 
term of payment, and otherwise. However, in its activities as 
the owner and grantor it controlled the limitation only as to 
the first purchasers. It is common knowledge that after the 
title passed to the buyer, the land then was subject to resale to 
grantees either private or corporate within the ordinary chan-
nels of purchase and sale in the field of private property 
acquisition and ownership. The buyer was then in position 
to sell to vd10m he pleased, or accumulate properties similarly 
purchased by others so that his total acreage might far exceed 
the original statutory acreage limitation. 
\1\f e attribute no merit to argument on bel1alf of the respond-
ents that the 160-acre limitation was conceived as a socialistic 
scheme to divide up private property for the benefit of the 
many at the expense of "larger landowners." It may not be 
denied that the 160-acre limitation originally had a social 
objective. It was designed to encourage home seekers to 
obtain and develop land ovmed by the federal government 
in the undeveloped western states and territories. The plan 
sought to arouse the interest of as many settlers as possible 
and to prevent, so far as could lawfully be done, the accumula-
tion of larg-e tracts of land h~T single individuals. This the 
government, as sole owner, could do as it pleased, without let 
or hindrance. 
Contrasted with the social objective of a land limitation 
in furtherance of the plan to encourage individuals as home 
seekers to purchase government lands and to initiate and 
increase the productivity of undeveloped public lands was the 
objective of the federal government in another field. That 
was in the grant to corporations seeking to provide trans-
continental transportation of alternate s0ctions of land for 20 
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miles on each side of the railroad right of way, as provided for 
in various acts of Congress. (See 43 U.S.C. § 881, et seq.) 
In a large sense it may be said that those grants had the 
social objective of aiding in the increase in population and 
development of the vast uninhabited expanse of land owned 
by the federal government by affording transportation more 
convenient, timely and certain than the covered wagon, the 
stage coach and the pony express. 
The foregoing objectives and others which might be men-
tioned were well within the power and control of the federal 
government as the owner of the lands to be granted or 
otherwise disposed of. But we are not here dealing with social 
objectives as such. We are here concerned with the question 
of the extent of power, dominion and control which the United 
States as a trustee may exercise to deprive beneficiaries of the 
trust, namely, the water users of the state and particularly 
those in the plaintiff district, of a property right thereunder 
or of an inchoate right to the use of water within the district. 
Under articles 34, 35, 36, and 37 of the contract, the owner 
of land in excess of 160 acres is called a "large land owner," 
and lands in excess of 160 acres are called "excess lands." 
If a so-called ''large land owner'' desires to avail himself 
of the benefits of project water on any of his lands, he must 
select from his larger tract 160 acres of land which is to be 
retained by him for the use of water. If the landowner 
refuses to make the selection, the members of the board of 
directors of the district may do so without his consent. If 
they do not, the Secretary of the Interior makes the selection. 
Excess lands may not receive water unless prior thereto the 
landowner executes a recordable contract between himself and 
the United States, whereby he agrees to sell his land in excess 
of 160 acres within 10 years at a price to be fixed by an 
appraisal board consisting of one appraiser appointed by the 
district, one by the Secretary of the Interior, and the two 
choosing a third. The landowner has no voice in the appraisal. 
The appraised value must be fixed as of the time of the 
execution of the recordable agreement and the appraisal cannot 
take into consideration any increase in the value of the land 
resulting from the supply of water to the land, or from any 
other normal increase in value such as might result from an 
increase in population, an extraordinary increase in the 
productivity of the land or perchance the discovery of oil 
or other valuable substances beneath the land. In practice, 
according to official government statements, the interpretation 
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(Section 46, Omnibus 
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636) similar to the excess land here is as follows : 
"Thus the administrative procedure usually adopted had been 
to refuse to deliver water to any lands, excess or non-excess, 
until the OYmer of excess land has executed a recordable 
contract to 
Survey on Federal Heelamation 
Interior [1946], p. 
It thus appears that the federal statute as interpreted by 
those it states in effect to the owner of land 
within the district susceptible of irrigation : ''If you own 
more than 160 acres of land within the District you may not 
enjoy one of the incidents of that ownership, namely, the right 
to the use of water to which you are entitled on all your 
land unless you agree to execute a recordable contract to sell 
your land in excess of 160 acres within 10 years at a price 
fixed by a board of appraisers in whose selection you have 
no voice and at a price to which you do not agree.'' In 
addition, no account is taken of the item of possible damage 
to the remainder of the land because of a possible severance, 
and a possible natural increment in land values. 
The duty of both of the contracting parties in the perform-
ance of their obligations to the landowners in the district is 
set forth in section 22250 of the Water Code. It is there 
provided that water distributed by districts shall be '' appor-
tioned ratably to each landowner upon the basis of the ratio 
which the last assessment against his land for district purposes 
bears to the whole sum assessed in the district'' except as 
provided otherwise in the code. No pertinent exceptions 
appear. 
[27] In addition to his right to due process, the landowner 
McCracken is entitled to equal protection of the laws. Dis-
crimination among water users in an irrigation district is 
expressly contrary to state law as expressed in the above 
quoted section 22250 of the Water Code. [28] The well 
established rule on this subject is expressed in City of Pasa-
dena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238 at pages 251 and 252 [27 P. 
604] as follows: ''. . . although a law is general and consti-
tutional when it applies equally to all persons embraced in a 
class founded upon some natural or intrinsic or constitutional 
distinction, it is not general or constitutional if it confers 
particular privileges or imposes peculiar disabilities or burden-
some conditions, in the exercise of a common right, upon a 
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class of persons arbitrarily selected from the general body 
of those who stand in precisely the same relation to the subjeet 
of the law." also Matter of Miller, 162 
CaL 687, 698 [124 P. 427] .) the fact that 
the 160-aert> limitation has been a 
Law for more years, 
diselose that of the limitation has been approved 
any court either state or federal, in a 
situation where the federal had no interest in 
the lands to be and only a trustee's interest 
in the waters to be applied. On the other hand the Supreme 
Court of in Owl C1·eck Irr. D1:st. v. Bryson, supra 
( 1953), 71 30, beginning at page 67 had the following 
to say \Yith reference to the terms of a contract similar as to 
the exeess land to the terms of the present contraet: 
'' 'fhe large landowner is specifieally defined in this subdivision 
and additional bnrdens imposed upon him. He is forbidden 
to rreeive \Yatrr for excess lands until he in all the 
conditions which by this and the two proceeding para-
graphs are upon him .... These rontract clauses which 
are thus if applied to owners of private lands are 
unreasonable, coerc·ive and devised to deprive them of their 
property against their will and without invoking the con-
demnatory processes which require due compensation to be 
made when land is thus taken. These processes embody the 
full protective machinery of the law as concerns the private 
property owner. These clauses now dravm in question ... 
are subversive of the most elementary rights which our fore-
fathees carried from English law to this country and which 
were centuries in their formation .... It is quite obvious 
if these contract clauses were to be scrutinized under the light 
of familiar constitutional limitations they would necessarily 
fall." 
[29] As to tlw acreage limitation of the contract, it is 
therefore concludt'd that the extent of the right of an owner 
of real property to the use and enjoyment of his property 
right, including the water right which may be attached thereto, 
cannot be constitutionally limited on the sole basis of the 
amount of property he owns. '!.'his is especially true with 
reference to property of the same kind and similarly situated. 
If there are any exeeptions to the rule whieh should be applied, 
they have not bt'rn poinflc:d out, nor, on reflection, are they 
apparent. [30] In other words tlJrre appears to be no basis 
founded in reason or mtthority why the owner of a property 
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right which is or may be appurtenant to all of his land suitable 
for irrigation can be limited in the enjoyment of that right 
to 160 acres of his larger holdings. The same right should 
attach to his lands in excess of 160 acres and to the excess lands 
of all those similarly situated. Thus to deprive members of 
the same class of their rights clearly results in an unlawful 
discrimination which as said in Pasadena v. Stimson, supra, 
91 Cal. 238, is not ''founded upon some natural or intrinsic 
or constitutional distinction.'' If a constitutionally authorized 
preferment may be extended only to owners of 160 acres of 
land or less the question might well be asked whether a like 
preferment might not be extended only to owners of more 
than 160 acres. The suggestion of either preferment under 
the long and well established rule governing classification is 
enough to demonstrate its impropriety. 
[26b] Notwithstanding the long prevailing provisions of 
the original Reclamation Act of 1902 that in the construction 
and operation of the reclamation projects under the supervis-
ion of the Secretary of the Interior, rights vested under state 
law should not be disturbed and should be protected, the 
contract in controversy is proposing to transgress those 
vested rights. The plaintiff district and the United States, 
through its Bureau of Reclamation, are parties to the contract 
but as to both the record discloses that they deemed them-
selves bound by federal law to include these provisions in the 
contract. That law is included in the original Reclamation 
Act of 1902. (32 Stats. p. 388.) It was reenacted and supple-
mented by the Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926 as amended. 
( 44 Stats. 636, § 46, now U.S. Public Lands Code Anno., 1955, 
§ 423e.) Section 46 of that act requires that any contract 
with an irrigation district bearing the approval of the Secre-
tary of the Interior shall include the 160-acre limitation. 
It is to be noted that this omnibus act covers many subjects 
dealing generally with federal reclamation projects where the 
intention of the act as show'!l by section 48 was the develop-
ment of public lands and the rehabilitation of some 20 federal 
reclamation projects theretofore existing in many of the 
western states. The omnibus act is now included, in material 
parts, in Title 43 United States Code, sections 1 to 670, in-
clusive. This volume is entitled "The Code of the Laws of the 
United States of America, 'ritle 43, Public Lands." A survey 
of this code shows that its provisions deal generally with the 
control, development and sale of public lands of the United 
States and section 46 may be deemed to apply to public lands 
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alone. If, however, its general language as to the 160-acre 
limitation be considered as applicable to the pnrehase by the 
United States of unappropriated domestie waters of this state 
and, as here, its distribution to irrigation districts and pri-
vately owned lands in the state, such a construction would 
obviously remove it from consideration as an" applicable" law 
governing the execution of the contract in question. 
Since its attempted application to the contract is unauthor-
ized under the laws of this state it is necessarily not an 
''applicable'' law. Also rarried into the Public Lands Code 
of the United States is the provision of the original Recla-
mation Act of 1902 that state laws remain unaffected by 
later enactments. This was recognized by the Supreme Court 
in the Gerlach case as late as 1950 where it said that when 
Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to proceed 
under the Reclamation Art of 1902 he should not interfere 
with the laws of the state " 'relating to the control, appropria-
tion, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any 
vested right acquired thereunder.' ( 32 Stats. 388, 390.)." 
(Unitecl States v. Gm·lach Livestock Co., supra, 339 U.S. 725, 
at page 739.) As indicated the federal law could be ap-
plicable only on the theory that the United States is the 
owner absolute of the domestic waters of the state with the 
right to the use thereof freed from any trust relationship on 
behalf of the real owners thereof, namely, the water users in 
the district. As also indicated such a theory is untenable and 
it necessarily follows that the inclusion in the contract of 
articles 34, 35, 36 and 37 cannot be legally justified. 
[31] Attention has been called to section 23200 of the 
\.Vater Code providing that under contracts such as the one in 
question water "shall be distributed and apportioned by the 
district in accordance with the applicable acts of Congress, 
the rules and regulations of the Secretary of the Interior 
thereunder, and the provisions of the contract." It is argued 
that since the 160-acre limitation is contained in the Federal 
Reclamation Act of 1902 the state, the owners of irrigable 
lands and the water users are snb.iect to that limitation. But 
such is not the case. Section 23200 contemplates that appli-
cable federal law shall apply. As previously noted the 160-
acre limitation is inapplicable in the present case where the 
title to the water to be purveyed is not an nnlimited title in 
the United States. 
An important question relating to the debter-creditor nature 
of the contract is raised by the attorney general and concerns 
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matters which as Chief of the Division of 
IN ater Hesources deems essential what said to be the 
established water law in this state. \Ve have heretofore de-
clared the debtor-creditor nature of the contract in 
In arriving at that conclusion it was considered that applicable 
federal law requires that the contract a amount 
of money to be repaid the district by installments, within 
40 years; that this is an obligation for repayment of the cost 
of construction of storage and delivery works, and that the 
payments the district be credited against this obligation. 
The attorney general asserts that this is an incorrect con-
struction of the federal Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (53 
Stats. 1195, 1196). He states that under present federal 
law the repayment of construction costs to the United States 
is governed by both section 9 (d) and 9 (e) of that act. Section 
9 (d) provides in part: 
"No water may be delivered for irrigation of lands in 
connection with any new project, new division of a project, 
or supplemental works on a project until an organization, 
satisfactory in form and powers to the Secretary, has entered 
into a repayment contract with the United States, in a form 
satisfactory to the Secretary, providing among other things 
... (2) That the part of the construction costs allocated by 
the Secretary to irrigation shall be included in a general repay-
ment obligation of the organization ... (3) That the general 
repayment obligation of the organization shall be spread in 
annual installments, of the number and amount fixed by the 
Secretary, over a period not exceeding forty years, exclusive 
of any development period fixed. . . . '' 
As section 9 (d) is read in the light of its particular 
provisions and of the general law, it is authority for the 
terms of Part B of the contract which provides for the repay-
ment of a stipulated sum in installments within 40 years. If 
the construction obligations are not paid within the times 
specified, the remedies for the enforcement of payment by 
assessment, taxation and possibly other means are provided 
for in the contract. 
Section 9 (e) of the Heclamation Project Act of 1939 pro-
vides: "In lieu of entering into a repayment contract pur-
suant to the provisions of subsection (d) of this section, to 
cover that part of the cost of the construction of works con-
nected with water supply and allocated to irrigation, the 
Secretary, in his discretion, may enter into short- or long-term 
contracts to furnish water for irrigation purposes. Each sub-
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(·ontraet c;hall b(; for ;;w·h peri()(l, not to exeeerl forly years, 
and at ~:;ueh ratf•s a~ in the 's jndgnwnt will produce 
revenues at le11st snffieie11t to cover an appropriate share of 
the aunual ope.ration and mainteuanee cost and an appropriate 
share of such fixr>d eharges as the Secretary deems proper, due 
eonsideration being given to that part of the cost of con-
struetion of works eonnected with water supply and allocated 
to irrigation, and shall reqnire payment of said rates each 
year in advarwc of delivery of water for said year. In the 
event such contrac~ts are made for furnishing water for irriga-
tion purposes, the eost of any irrigation water distributing 
works construeted by the United States in eonneetion with the 
new project, new division of a project, or supplemental works 
on a projeet, shall be covered by a repayment contract entered 
into pursuant to said subsection (d)." 
In view of the last sentence of section 9 (e), it is conceded by 
the attorney general that Part B of the contract for the 
eonstruetion of the physieal works is a repayment contract, 
but the question raised is whether the water delivery portions 
of the contract (Part A) are invalid because of inferences 
whieh may be drawn that the district and landowners therein 
are not entitled to water rights which continue beyond the 
40-year term of the contract. 
(32a] It is contended by the attorney general that the 
United States has properly contracted as a water purveyor 
under section 9 (e). The State Engineer contends that the 
United States improperly assumes to take section 9 (e) as its 
authority for an alternate methorl of contracting with the state, 
that is, that the United States has construed that section to 
mean that, in lieu of a definite contract for repayment within 
40 years, the ·united States may waive or avoid the repayment 
provisions in regard to its water rights and obligation to sup-
ply water to the district and substitute therefor the right to 
renew or not to renew the contract as the occasion might 
suit its purpose and elect to continue to serve the district 
with water but under terms and eonditions which it might 
impose in the nature of an utility service, with no power upon 
the part of the district as the contracting agency of the state 
to prevent it from so doing. It is claimed by the State 
Engineer that the United States and particularly the Bureau 
of Reclamation and its legal advisers have decided that section 
9 (e) contains snch authorization. The record supports that 
contention by doeuments and transcripts of hearings before 
47 C.2d-21 
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Congressional committPrs whieh need not now be set forth at 
length. 
It is because of this asserted authorization to the Bureau 
of Reclamation that the State Engineer is much concerned. 
The effect of the validation of this contract would be, impliedly 
at least, to approve a procedure by which the United States as 
a purveyor of the domestic waters of this state, might continue 
indefinitely to by-pass the established law of the state and 
procedures thereunder applicable to water services generally. 
In furnishing its domestic waters to consumers at a price, 
the activities of the United States under its purported con-
struction of section 9 (e) resemble those of a public utility 
acting in a proprietary capacity. [33] As above noted, the 
Reclamation Act of 1902 provided that: "Nothing in this 
act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to 
in any way interfere with the laws of any state or territory 
relating to the control, appropriation, use or distribution of 
water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired there-
under and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the 
provisions of this act, shall proceed in conformity with such 
laws .... " It may fairly be said that the foregoing federal 
statutory provision remains in full force; that it controls 
the operations of the Department of the Interior so far as 
federal law is concerned, and that under the controlling state 
law, the furnishing of water to consumers by a utility must be 
subject to and be in conformity with certain rules and regu-
lations established by or under the authority of the Consti-
tution and the statutes of the state. 
[20b] Moreover, as we have already held, whatever title 
the United States has to the domestic waters of this state is 
limited by the trusteeship under which that title was acquired. 
The United States cannot administer the corpus of that trust 
except in the manner defined by the terms of the trust, namely, 
the applicable water law of this state. The attorney 
general argues that in this validation proceeding it is not 
necessary to consider what might or might not be contem-
plated at the termination of the contract, but the water rights 
of the landowners in the district, as members of the class 
to which the beneficiaries of the declared trust belong, are 
present and existing (sec Ickes v. B'o:;c, 300 U.S. 82, 93-94 [57 
S.Ct. 412, 81 L.Ed. 525]), and they are entitled to a declara-
tion thereof. ''By directing the Secretary to proceed under 
the Reclamation Act of 1902, Congress elected not 'to in any 
way interfere with the laws of the State ... relating to the 
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control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in 
irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder.' '' (United 
States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., supra, 339 U.S. 725.) [34] If 
this contract were construed as imposing upon the district and 
the landowners therein a burden under which they may suffer 
the loss of water rights at the discretion of the United States, 
such a construction would be contrary to well established 
confltitutional principles and protections. 
[35] The nlidity of the eoutraet is Rought to be established 
under the Second Validating Act of 1949. ( Stats. 1949, p. 
1511.) The attitude of the United States is reflected in the 
position of the attorney general to the effect that "any non-
constitutional defects in the contracts under state law" were 
cured by the act. 
The act became effective on October 1, 1949, which was 
90 days after the :final adjournment of the Legislature of that 
year. The act "con :firmed, valiclatcd, and declared legally 
effective ... all Acts and proceedings heretofore taken by a 
public body under any law, or under color of any law, for 
the authorization" of "all instruments evidencing indebted-
ness of a public body incurred or to be incurred for any 
publie purpose. . . . '' The act includes proceedings taken 
by ''counties, cities and counties, cities, public districts of 
every kind or class'' and some 50 other specifically named 
public bodies, including irrigation districts. The attorney 
general contends that "this language clearly covers contracts 
between irrigation districts and the United States for a water 
supply and distribution system construction." 
In this connection it appears that at the time the Second 
Validating Act of 1949 was passed by the I_jegislature the eon-
tract was not in existence; that it was not approved by the 
electors of the district until August 23, 1949, and that it was 
not signed until September 23, 1949. [36] It would seem 
that validating statutes cover only those transactions or omis-
sions which occur before the Legislature adjourns. Such 
acts no doubt serve a useful purpose but as said by Chief 
Justice Beatty in Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 
Cal. 160 at pages 194 and 195 [50 P. 277]: "It is to be 
regretted ... that a court should ever feel itself bound by 
rules of construction to give effect to statutes which ratify and 
confirm by wholesale the acts of municipal or other political 
agencies of the state. There is no more reckless or dangerous 
species of legislation. It is really legislating with the eyes 
shut, and ... should ... be closely scrutinized and strictly 
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considered in order to prevent as far as possible the evils 
which they involve .... " 
If the position of the attorney general be sustained, it 
would mean that from the time of the final adjournment of the 
Legislature on July 2, 1949, to October 1, 1949, every city, 
city and county, county, and some 50 specifically named other 
public entities or agencies of the state could run full rein 
in violation of all of the laws of the state governing and 
regulating the making of contracts and the incurring of obli-
gations for the payment of public moneys thereunder not 
constitutionally otherwise controlled. Likewise, within that 
90-day period they could do anything not yet subjected to 
regulation but which could be constitutionally authorized and 
this situation would continue during the 90 days after the 
final adjournment of the I1egislature. A validation act 
assumes legislative consciousness of some act or omission 
on the part of the public body affected which is designE)d to 
be cured or confirmed. After the final adjournment of the 
Legislature and until the effective date of the act (90 days 
thereafter) there is no opportunity for the exercise of this 
legislative purpose to function. Obviously the only purpose 
of postponing the effective date of the act is to permit the 
referendum provisions of the law to be made available. 
[37] Furthermore if the contract be deemed to include 
a utility type contract at the option of the United States, 
the Second Validating Act of 1949, or any validating act of 
the character of the one here relied upon by the attorney 
general, could not render such a contract valid. It is 
well settled that the Legislature may ratify only what it could 
have theretofore authorized. It is obvious that the 
Legislature could not by a general ratifying statute breathe 
validity into a contract the effect of which would be to avoid 
all of the laws of the state, both constitutional and statutory, 
respecting the regulation and control of public utilities in 
this state. [38] Assuming the plenary power of the Legis-
lature to enact laws respeeting the regulation and control of 
public utilities notwithstanding any provision of the Consti-
tution to the contrary, (Art. 12, § 22, Constitution) neverthe-
less such legislation must appear on its face to be cognate 
and germane to the regulation of public utilities to come within 
the Legislature's plenary power. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 655, 656 [137 P. 1119, Ann.Cas. 1915C 
822, 5 L.R.A.N.S. 652].) [39] There is nothing on the face 
of this ratifying statute to indieate in the slightest degree 
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that it relate" to the and eontrol of public utilities. 
It is therefore ineffective to circumvent the laws of the state 
requiring regulation and t·Otltrol of aetivitiC'S whieb arc iu all 
essential respects those of a pnhlic utility. In addition any 
validating act could not have confirmed the 160-acre limitation 
for the obvious reason that the I,egislature eould not have 
theretofore constitutionally authorized it. 
[40] The distriet attorney of Ventura County has filed a 
brief as amicus euriae on behalf of the Ventura County Flood 
Control District. He ealls attention to the deelaration of 
the trial eourt in its eonclusions of law to the effect that when 
water is furnished by a purveyor of water under the laws of 
this state to a landowner for irrigation purposes such owner 
thereby acquires a vested right to the continuance of such 
serviCe. 
Objection to the views of the trial court in this respect 
is made on the ground that they do not correctly reflect the 
present laws of the state on the subject. 'rhis is the only 
cause of concern on the part of counsel for the flood control 
district. The background for this objection is disclosed 
by the following facts: The Ventura Valley has highly de-
veloped urban and interurban industrial and agricultural 
areas which have been subjected to a shortage of water 
with threatened need of further sufficient supply. To alleviate 
this water condition the Ventura County Flood Control 
District was organized under chapter 44 of the Statutes of 
1943 (p. 168). One storage dam has been constructed and 
another is in the course of construction or nearly completed. 
'l'he distribution systems have not been completed but water 
is stored in the reservoirs. Pending the completion of the 
distribution systems the district is furnishing to certain 
lands outside of the district some of the stored water under 
contracts with the users that when the system within the 
district is completed and water made available to landowners 
within the district the use of water outside of the district 
will terminate. This arrangement was made because of the 
dire need of water on lands without the district for even 
temporary purposes and perhaps to tide the owners thereof 
over to a time when they could develop an additional supply 
of water on their own behalf. If this temporary agreement 
with the outside land owners is not permitted because of the 
declaration of the trial court, increasing amounts of water 
now in storage and to be stored in the reservoirs of the 
Ventura district will be required to go to waste. 
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There IS no law of this state which may properly be 
invoked to prevent such a temporary arrangement. The 
question is pertinent to the present case because of the fact 
that a supplemental water supply has been furnished to 
land owners in the Ivanhoe Irrigation District by the United 
States for an extensive period pending the negotiations for 
a contract such as involved in the present proceeding. 
There appear to be early cases to the effect that when a 
purveyor of the domestic waters of the state furnishes water 
to lands for irrigation purposes, the right of the owner of 
the lands to a continuance of the use may not be cut off. 
The rules of the earlier cases have in general been modified 
by enactments in the \Vater Code of the state with reference 
to the use of water as authorized by the Constitution. As 
bearing on the right acquired by user in particular cases, 
including the rights of landowners in connection with the 
administration of the water law of the state the Legislature 
has provided in division 11 (irrigation districts), part 5, 
chapter 2, article 2 (water distribution, § 22262) as follows: 
"No right in any water or water right owned by the district 
shall be acquired by use permitted under this article." (Stats. 
1943, p. 1897, based on Stats. 1897, p. 259.) An identical 
provision is contained in that portion of the code pertaining 
to Water Districts (Wat. Code, § 35428). Other code pro-
visions provide authority for entities supplying public water 
to serve some of their territories with water and not serve 
others in the event of shortages. (Wat. Code, §§ 22252.1, 
35435; Pub. Util. Code, §§ 2708, 2710, 2711.) 
[41] It is claimed that article 26 of the contract purports 
to condition the delivery of water to a landowner otherwise 
entitled to delivery, upon the payment by him of any assess-
ment levied although it has been judicially declared to be a 
void assessment. It seems unusual that a party should, ex-
cept under compulsion, contract to pay an assessment de-
clared to be void by a court of competent jurisdiction. But 
when taken as a reasonable and additional assurance of 
reimbursements to the United States for expenditures in-
curred on behalf of the district and to cover operating expenses 
in furnishing water to the district, it may be deemed a legi-
timate subject of contract. 
Questions are raised as to the sufficiency of the notice of 
election whereby the electors of the district were called upon 
to approve the proposed contract, and the trial court con-
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eluded that the contract was invalid for lack of proper notice. 
(W at. Code, § 23223.) These questions need not be de-
termined in this case for the reason that upon submission 
of any further proposed contract they need not recur. 
The trial court in its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law declared the contract to be invalid on numerous addi-
tional grounds not carried into the judgment. Conclusions 
that the contract is uncertain, lacks mutuality, improperly 
delegates powers to the Secretary of the Interior, improperly 
prevents changes in the boundaries of the district, provides 
unreasonable security measures to the United States and 
other conclusions not necessary to the judgment are insuffici-
ently supported when considered in connection with the 
views herein expressed as to the terms under which the parties 
may properly contract. 
In accordance with the foregoing it is concluded : 
(1) That the plaintiff is an irrigation district duly 
organized, existing and operating as such under the laws of 
this state. 
[Sb, 18b] (2) That the title to the unappropriated domes-
tic waters of the state is in the State of California in trust for 
the water users of the state as beneficiaries and such waters 
are subject to appropriation under the laws of the state. 
[15b] (3) That the United States as assignee of appro-
priative rights, as original appropriator thereof, and in the 
acquisition of other rights for the same purpose stands in the 
same relation to such beneficial owners as does the state, 
namely, as trustee for such beneficial owners and is answer-
able for the faithful performance of that trust. 
[26c] ( 4) That in distributing the water contracted to 
be delivered to the District the United States does so as a 
purveyor of water at a price for the benefit of the water 
users of the District. 
(5) That in so delivering the water to the District 
it is not competent for the United States or the District, 
either or both, to discriminate against the present or po-
tential water users in the District on the basis of the amount 
of land owned by them, and that the 160-acre limitation con-
tained in the original Reclamation Act is inapplicable to the 
subject matter of the contract and is improperly contained 
therein. 
[2lb] ( 6) 'fhat insofar as the contract provides for the 
construction of works for the storage and distribution of 
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water to and by the district, the relationship of the parties 
is that of contractor and contractee. Upon the completion 
of the construction work the district is obligated under the 
law to pay for the same within 40 years in equal annual 
installments. Upon the completion of . such payments the 
district is entitled to ownership of the works and property 
of the storage and distribution system free from any claims 
of the United States. 
[32b] (7) That insofar as the contract provides for fur-
nishing water to the district at a price the United States in act-
ing as a purveyor of domestic waters of the state to the district, 
under federal law, is bound to observe and comply with the 
laws of the state with reference to the rights which are vested 
in the water users being served or entitled to be served. In 
this respect neither the state nor any of its agencies may 
contract or otherwise provide that the distribution of water 
to those for whose benefit the right to the water was acquired 
may be arbitrarily discontinued. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
GIBSON, C. J.-I dissent. 
The holding of the majority opinion, which invalidates the 
160-acre water limitation and other vital provisions of the 
contract between Ivanhoe Irrigation District and the United 
States Government, undermines the very foundation of fed-
eral reclamation policy and threatens to end the flow of 
federal funds into this state for reclamation and irrigation 
purposes at a time when the need for rapid development of 
our water resources is most critical. In reaching its conclusion 
the majority ignores the Irrigation District Federal Coopera-
tion Law of this state, relies on a statutory provision relating 
to the apportionment of water by districts which is inappli-
cable to water from a federal project, and enunciates a trust 
theory with respect to the ownership of water which has no 
basis in existing law, is unsound in principle, and will prove 
a serious obstacle in the resolution of state-wide problems 
involving the distribution and utilization of available water 
supplies for domestic and industrial purposes, the irrigation 
of land, and the production of power. 
The Central Valley Project, which is now nearing comple-
tion, is a federal undertaking being built under the provisions 
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of the national reclamation laws. Since the passage of the 
Pederal Heelamation A.ct in 1902, the federal statutes have 
a limit on the amount of irrigation water from fed-
eral projeets which \Yill be sold to any one landowner, namely, 
sufficient water to meet the needs of 160 acres of land. In 
California, by reason of our community property law, the 
limitation has been interpreted as allowing a man and wife 
to sufficient water to supply 320 acres. (Graham, "The 
Ccntml Yallcy Project: Resmwce Development of a Natural 
Bas1:n" ( 1950), 38 Cal.L.Hev. 588, 608-611.) The restriction 
is not a limit on the amount of land a person may own. There 
is nothing in the governing federal statute, section 46 of the 
Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, which compels an indi-
vidual who owns more than 160 acres to sell any of his land 
as a condition to receiving water sufficient for 160 acres. 
( 44 U.S. Stat. 649, 43 U.S.C.A. § 423e (Supp. 1955) .) He 
may retain all his land, receiving federal project water for 
the first 160 acres and irrigating the remainder with whatever 
other water may be available. It is only where he elects to 
delivery of federal project water for the portion of 
his land in excess of 160 acres that he may be compelled to 
dispose of the excess land within a period of time fixed by 
the Secretary of the Interior. (See Graham, op. cit., 38 Cal. 
L.Rev. at pp. 606-608.) 
'rhe suggestion that the limitation may not have been 
intended to apply to lands held in private ownership prior to 
eonstruction of a reclamation project flies in the face of 
specific language in the statute of 1902, which provides that 
uo right to the use of water ''for land in private ownership 
shall be sold for a tract exceeding 160 acres to any one land-
owner .... " (32 U.S. Stat. 389, 43 U.S.C.A. § 431.) Subse-
quent enactments contain similar provisions making specific 
reference to lands in private ownership. (36 U.S Stat. 926 
(1911), 43 U.S.C.A. § 524; 37 U.S. Stat. 266 (1912), 43 
lT.S.C.A. § 544; 38 U.S. Stat. 689 (1914), 43 U.S.C.A. § 418; 
44 U.S. Stat. 649-650 (1926), 43 U.S.C.A. § 423e (Supp. 
1955) ; see Graham, op. cit., 38 Cal.L.Rev. at p. 616.) The 
Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926 expressly requires that con-
tracts between the federal government and irrigation districts 
shall contain the acreage limitation as a condition to delivery 
of water from a federal project. ( 44 U.S. Stat. 649-650, 43 
U.S.C.A. § 423e (Supp. 1955).) Thus the water limitation 
in the Ivanhoe contract follows the requirement of the federal 
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statute, and, unle~s the ~tatutory limitation may properly be 
construed a~ inapplieable in California, or is declared uneon-
stitutional, or is removed from the law by eongressional aetion, 
the representative~ of the federal government would have no 
power to negotiate a new eontraet without it. 
Loeal irrigation distriets are authorized by state law to 
enter into eontracts with the federal government for a water 
supply on tenns required or authorized by federal law. Direct 
authority for the action of the Ivanhoe district is found in the 
California vVater Code whieh, since its adoption in 1943, has 
eontained a chapter known as the Irrigation District Federal 
Cooperation Law ( § 23175 et seq.), most provisions of which 
are based on statutes originally enacted in 1917 (Stats. 1917, 
eh. 160). Section 23195 provides: "Districts may cooperate 
and contract with the United States under the Federal 
Heelamation Act of June 17, 1902, and all acts amendatory 
thereof or supplementary thereto or any other act of Congress 
heretofore or hereafter enacted permitting cooperation." No 
delegation of legislative power is involved, and the state law 
elearly authorizes a contract which includes the provisions 
of the :F'ederal Omnibus Adjustment Aet of 1926. Section 
23196 of the Water Code authorizes districts to contract with 
the United States for a water supply and for acquisition and 
operation of works for irrigation. 
vVith respect to the delivery, distribution, and apportion-
ment of water among irrigators, section 23197 provides that 
district contracts with the federal government may include 
provisions for " (a) Delivery and distribution of water for 
the land in the district under the ~·elevant acts of Congress 
.and the rules and regulations established thereunder. . . , '' 
and section 23200 provides, ''All water, the right to the use 
of whieh is acquired by a district under any contract with 
the United States shall be distr·ibuted and apportioned by the 
d-istrict in accordance with the applicable acts of Congress, 
the rules and regu.lations of the Secretary of the Interior 
thereunder, and the provisions of the contract, ... " (Italics 
added.) 
The majority takes the position that sections 23197 and 
23200 must be construed as referring only to federal acts 
which do not conflict with state law and that the 160-acre 
limitation in the contract is invalid because it assertedly con-
flicts with section 22250 of the state Water Code which pro-
vides that water shall be apportioned ratably to each land-
owner on the basis of the last assessment against his land for 
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district purposes. 1 The only reasonable interpretation of sec-
tions 23197 and 23200 is that the Legislature intended to 
authorize irrigation districts to enter into contracts with re-
gard to the delivery, distribution, and apportionment of fed-
eral project water under the terms imposed by Congress as 
a condition to participation of the federal government in such 
contracts. The substance of section 22250 is contained in 
statutes enacted long before there was any water limitation 
in the federal reclamation law and before this state adopted 
the Irrigation District Federal Cooperation Law, the express 
purpose of which was to enable irrigation districts to secure 
the assistance of the United States Government in obtaining 
a water supply. Moreover, section 22250 is a general provi-
sion governing the distribution of irrigation water by districts, 
and it is obviously qualified by the more recent provisions in 
sections 23197 and 23200 which relate specifically to the 
distribution and apportionment of federal project water under 
contracts between irrigation districts and the United States. 
As we have seen, sections 23197 and 23200 authorize the 
acquisition of a supply of water from the United States and 
direct that such water shall be distributed and apportioned 
by the district in accordance with the applicable acts of Con-
gress, the rules established thereunder, and the provisions 
of the contracts. It follows that section 22250 cannot prevail 
here in the face of the water limitation which is required by 
the federal statute and which is thus authorized by sections 
23197 and 23200. 
It should also be noted in considering the effect of section 
22250 that the statute should not be interpreted as fixing 
the exclusive method of apportioning available water among 
landowners in all irrigation districts in the state. Section 
22250 appears in part 5 of division 11 of the Water Code 
relating to the powers and purposes of irrigation districts, 
and, to be at all intelligible, it must be read in connection 
with the provisions in part 5 and elsewhere relating to the 
financing by a district of the cost of constructing, maintaining 
and operating an irrigation system. Aside from incidental 
1Section 222i50 of the Water Code provides: ''All water distributed 
by districts for irrigation purposes shall except when otherwise pro-
vided in this article he apportioned ratably to each landowner upon the 
basis of the ratio which the last assessment against his land for district 
purposes bears to the whole sum assessed in the district for district pur-
poses." The substance of this section was included in the statutes of 
1887, page 34, section 11. It also appears in the statutes of 1897, page 
259, section 18. 
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sources of revenue, there are two major methods of financing 
a district irrigation system under the ·water Code: ( ad 
valorem assessments on land in the district ( § 25500 et seq.; 
see § 25503); and (2) tolls charged to district irrigators for 
water delivered and other services ( § 22280 et seq). ·where 
all district costs are financed by levying ad valorem assess-
ments on district land, the formula for water apportionment 
set out in section 222:50 is dearly applieable and, when eouplccl 
with a provision such as section 22251 authorizing a land-
owner to assign any or all water apportioned to him, is reason-
able. (Fallbrook hr. Dist. v. Bradley (1896), 164 U.S. 112, 
162-163 [17 S.Ct. 56, 64, 41 L.Ed. 369].) But, once an irri-
gation sy:stem is in operation and the di:strict, as it may, 
finances a share or all of its expenses by means of eharging 
rates or tolls to actual water users, it seems clear that the 
formula for water apportionment in seetion 22250 is not 
intended to apply. 
rrhe uncertainties and inequities of the assessed-land-value 
formula for water apportionment were discussed in ·willard 
v. Glenn-Colusa Irr. Dist. (1927), 201 Cal. 726, 741-743 [258 
P. 959], where this court upheld the constitutionality of a 
1911 statute providing that, "In lieu (either in part or in 
whole) of levying assessments," irrigation districts have the 
power to raise all or part of the cost of operating and main-
taining an irrigation system by means of charging rates or 
tolls to actual water consumers. (Cal. Irrig. Dist. Act, §55, 
Stats. 1911, p. 516 [now Wat. Code,§ 22280]; see Water Code, 
§ 25655.) It was pointed out that the assessed-land-valuation 
formula for water apportionment created hardship and uncer-
tainty for owners of land having a relatively low assessed valu-
ation but containing crops which required more water than 
the land would be entitled to under the formula for water 
apportionment. ''On the other hand,'' states the opinion, ''by 
giving to the board of directors [of an irrigation district] 
the power to raise the whole or a part of the cost of main-
tenance by tolls . . . every land owner of the district is 
given an opportunity to the extent of the water supply of 
the district of securing a definite, certain, and adequate 
supply of water for his lands." (201 Cal. at p. 743.) While 
the q11estion of water apportionment was not before the court, 
the language of the opinion clearly indicates that the formula 
for apportionment in section 22250 is not applicable in a 
situation where all or part of the district expenses are paid 
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hy mean;:; of charging rates or tolls to aetual water users rather 
than levying an ad valorem tax on district land. 
Ivanhoe and most of the other irrigation districts in the 
state have adopted the practice of defraying costs of main-
temmce and operation by means of a combined system of 
assessm.:•nts and charging rates or tolls to actual water 
users. (See Willar·cl v. Glenn-Colusa Irr. Dist., 201 Cal. at 
p. 744; Cal. . of Pub. \Vorks, Div. \Vater Resources, 
Bull. 21 K, "Hr>port on Irrigation Districts of California for 
the year " pp. 8, 22; ibid., Bull. 21P, "Heport on Irriga-
tion Districts in California, 1944-1950," appendix.) The 
serviee::; for \rhich tolls and rates may be charged have been 
gradually extended. (See W at. Code, § 22280.) Section 25655 
provides that revenues derived from such rates or tolls may 
be spent for ''district purposes'' generally, and section 25219 
authorizes their use to pay principal and interest on construc-
tion and refunding bonds. Hence most, if not all, district 
expenses may ultimately be financed not by assessments but 
by tolls charged to actual water and power consumers (see 
Willard v. Glenn-Colusa Irr. Dist., 201 Cal. at pp. 740-741), 
and the Legislature could not have intended that the water 
apportionment formula in seetion 22250 should be applicable 
under such circumstances. 
Even if it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that there 
is a conflict between seetion 22250 and the water limitation 
provisions of the federal statutes, the assertion by the majority 
that seetion 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act provides for the 
supremacy of state law is untenable. Section 8 provides: 
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting or 
intended to affect or in any way interfere with the laws of 
any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, 
use or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested 
right aequired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, 
in carrying out the provisions of this chapter, shall proceed 
in conformity with such laws .... " However, as stated in 
Nebraska v. Wyoming (1945), 325 U.S. 589, 612, 615 [65 S.Ct. 
1332, 89 L.Ed. 1815], seetion 8 will not be construed in every 
instance to mean that "where Congress has provided a system 
of regulation for federal projects it must give way before an 
inconsistent state system." (Emphasis added.) In the pres-
ent case it is conceded that all water rights necessary to con-
struction of the irrigation system have been acquired by the 
federal government in strict compliance with state law. The 
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question before us is how a future supply of water from the 
completed federal project, water not hitherto available, shall 
be apportioned among district landowners. The 160-acre 
water limitation is clearly part of a "system of regulation" 
for federal projects within the meaning of the language quoted 
above from Nebraska v. Wyoming and thus appears to fall in 
that area where section 8 does not compel federal law to give 
way before inconsistent state legislation; hence, if there is any 
state-recognized vested right which, in fact, conflicts with the 
acreage limitation, that right may be taken and compensated 
for by the federal government under its power of eminent 
domain. (See Unitecl States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 
U.S. 725, 733, 739 [70 S.Ct. 955, 94 L.Ed. 1231] ; 32 U.S. 
Stat. 389, 43 U.S.C.A. § 421 (Supp. 1955); Rivers and Har-
bors Act of 1937, § 2, 50 U.S. Stat. 844, 850.) rrhe question 
of compensation for loss or threatened invasion of a vested 
water right is not before us. 
In holding the Ivanhoe contract invalid, the majority opin-
ion invokes the aid of a "trust" theory assertedly based on 
general state law. The theory is that unappropriated domestic 
water is owned by the state in trust for water users and that 
the federal government can acquire no title to appropriative 
water rights free of such trust. For reasons hereinafter 
stated, it is my opinion that the trust theory is erroneous, 
but, if it be assumed that such a trust exists, it is clear, as 
indicated above, that there is nothing in the federal water 
limitation which conflicts with state law, state water policy, 
or the best interests of the water users of the state, hence 
nothing which can be held to constitute a breach of trust. 
There is no legal basis for the trust theory developed by 
the majority opinion. The Constitution and statutes of Cali-
fornia reserve to the state considerable control over the use 
to which domestic water shall be put but contain nothing 
which creates a trust as to such waters. Section 3 of article 
XIV of the Constitution provides in substance that the water 
resources of the state must not be wasted, that conservation 
of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable 
and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for 
the public welfare, and that the right to the use or flow of 
water from any natural stream or water course in the state 
is limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for 
the beneficial use to be served. Sections 104 and 105 of the 
\Vater Code provide, in effect, that the state may regulate 
the use of water in the interest of the people. These and 
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other general regulatory provisions apply to all water and 
water rights, whether riparian, appropriative or underlying, 
and whether privately or publicly owned. 
The fact is that no declaration of trust is intended or 
effectuated by these general provisions enunciating water 
policy and providing for regulation, and they are in no way 
inconsistent with the existence of full title to water rights 
in the state or in private persons. While the use to which 
certain property may be put is controlled by state law, this 
does not mean that the owner thereof has something less than 
full title. It adds nothing to the strength and effectiveness of 
the laws regulating the use of water to say that they give 
rise to a trust relationship between the state and water users, 
but, to the contrary, such language threatens to confuse the 
development of our water law. The very use of the term 
"trust" draws with it the problem of applying settled trust 
principles to all water rights in the state, or at least to those 
acquired by appropriation-a problem which will certainly 
be attended by much uncertainty and difficulty. 
Let us examine the trust theory as applied to the water 
rights involved in the present proceeding. The United States 
is acquiring the water rights necessary to completion of the 
project by means of (1) assignment of applications for appro-
priation made by the state, (2) applications for appropriation 
made directly by the United States, and (3) purchase and 
exchange agreements made by the United States with certain 
private owners of riparian rights to divert the flow of the 
San Joaquin River. (Graham, op. cit., 38 Cal.L.Rev. 596-
600.) With regard to the first two, which relate to hitherto 
unappropriated water, even if it be assumed that all unappro-
priated water and water to which an appropriative right 
is not fully perfected belongs to the state, the ownership rights 
of the state do not differ from its rights in other state-owned 
property. Certainly the state has full title to the water and 
water rights which belong to it, and the people, acting through 
their representatives and within the limits of the Constitution, 
may dispose of it as they see fit. There may be occasions when 
the state would find it necessary to weigh the interests of 
a small group of potential water users against those of a 
much larger group, but it is difficult to see how this would be 
possible if all water nsers of the state have equal rights as 
beneficiaries of the trust, and it would be even more difficult 
if, as suggested, the water users of a particular distrirt are 
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the sole beneficiaries of a trust in all waters which may ever 
be brought into the district. .Application of a trust theory, 
in such a situation, would be an obstacle to the development 
of a water plan otherwise consistent with the best interests 
of a majority of the people. In the absence of any specifie 
constitutional or statutory provision establishing a trust, it is 
improper for this court to restrict the power of the state 
Legislature and the people as a whole by the device of declar-
ing that such a trust relationship exists. 
The series of eases beginning with Merchants Nat. Bank of 
San Diego v. Escondido Irr. Dist., 144 Cal. 329 [77 P. 937], 
which are cited in support of the trust theory, are not in point 
because they deal not with the relationship of the state to 
domestic waters but rather with the functions of irrigation 
districts under statutes which, like section 22437 of the "'vVater 
Code, specifically declared that such a district held its prop-
erty ''in trust'' for the purposes of the district. 
Nor is there anything in section 102 of the Water Code 
which supports the trust theory. The section reads, ''All 
water within the State is the property of the people of the 
State, but the right to the use of water may be acquired by 
appropriation in the manner provided by law." Nothing in 
this language is inconsistent with the view that the state holds 
and can convey full and complete title to the water rights 
which it owns. And it is settled that the broad statement, 
''.All water within the State is the property of the people of 
the State,'' has no application to privately owned water or 
water rights. (San Bernardino v. Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 29-30 
[198 P. 7841.) The court in the San Bernardino case said 
with respect to this broad language, "Taken literally, this 
would include all water in the state privately owned and that 
pertaining to lands of the United States, as well as that owned 
by the state. It should not require discussion or authority to 
demonstrate that the state cannot in this manner take pri-
vate property for public use .... The constitution expressly 
forbids it. (Art. I, § 14.) The water that pertained to or 
was contained in the lands of the state was already the prop-
erty of the people when this [statute] was adopted. The 
statute was without effect on any other property." (186 Cal. 
7, at pp. 29-30.) 
With respect to the third method by which the United 
States is acquiring water rights, i.e., through purchase and 
exehange agreements made with private owners of riparian 
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\Ve have been cited to no case which holds that the state 
or prh'ate persons cannot hold full and complete title to water 
or water rights, and the constitutional and provi-
sions regulating the use of water which are relied on the 
majority opinion do not, even by remote implication, require 
or justify the application of a trust theory in this field. Under 
existing law water may be used only for beneficial purposes, 
and all property of the state is held for the benefit of the 
people and is subject to use and disposition only in their 
best interest. The application of formal trnst principles in 
this field thus appears to be totally unwarranted. Monover, 
the ramifications of the trust theory as applied by the majority 
are infinite, technical and unpredietable and, as pointed out 
above, may prove to be a handicap in the future development 
of the water resources of this state. 
'l'he water rights acquired by the United States must, of 
course, be used in accordance with federal law. Under sec-
tion 8 of the Reclamation Act appropriations may be made 
by the federal government, not for its own use, but only for 
the use of landowners; the right to the use of water aequired 
under the act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and 
benefieial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit 
of the right. (Nebraska v. Wyoming (1945), 325 U.S. 589, 
614-615 [65 S.Ct. 1332, 89 L.Ed. 1815].) 
The suggestion that the 160-acre limitation violates prin-
ciples of equal proteetion and due procesR is without merit. 
This court cannot, of course, properly enter into a discussion 
of the wisdom of the limitation or the desirability of having 
it apply to the farming economy of the central valley in Cali-
fornia. These are matters for Congress to determine. The 
limitation has remained in the federal reclamation law for 
over 50 years and has survived numerous efforts to eliminate 
it.2 (Taylor, "The Excess Land Law: Execution of a Public 
Policy" (1955), 64 Yale L.J. 477, 502-503.) It seems clear 
that the limitation upon the amount of water from a federal 
irrigation project to be sold to any one landowner creates a 
reasonable classification in furtherance of the purposes of 
2In three instances Congress speci:fically exempted certain reclamation 
projects in Colorado, Nevada and California from the limitation, but 
all attempts to obtain such an exemption for the Central Valley Project 
have failed. (Taylor, op. cit., at pp. G02-i>Oil. \ 
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the federal legislation. The federal government does not pro-
pose to recover the entire cost of building the Central Valley 
Project, and its construction and operation will result in a 
considerable subsidy to irrigators.3 They will have the long 
term use of federal money necessary to finance the construc-
tion of dams, storage and distribution systems for their bene-
fit, free of interest, and will bear the ultimate cost of only 
a small part of the capital outlay allocated to irrigation con-
struction. The water limitation was intended to prevent use 
of the reclamation service for speculative purposes, and it 
insures that the irrigators' subsidy and other benefits of 
federal irrigation projects will not go in disproportionate 
share to a few large landowners but will be confined to holders 
of moderate-size tracts of land sufficient to maintain one 
family; its purpose, in other words, is to distribute the govern-
ment benefits in accordance with the greatest good for the 
greatest number of individuals. (Graham, op. cit., 38 Cal. 
L.Rev. at 617.) .Any vested rights of the landowners which 
are taken by the federal government must, of course, be com-
pensated for, but the problems of compensation are not within 
the issues of this proceeding. It should be noted in this con-
nection that none of the landowners in the district has riparian 
rights or perfected appropriative rights to the waters involved 
here and that the land of Courtney McCracken, the indi-
vidual defendant who is opposing confirmation of the con-
tract, is located about 100 miles from the river from which 
such waters come. 
3 That portion of costs allocated to navigation and flood control 
(approximately 12 per cent of total estimated cost) is nonreimbursable. 
Of the costs for which the United States will be reimbursed, expenditures 
allocated to irrigation represent approximately 63 per cent of the total. 
Of the remainder, costs allocated to municipal and industrial water 
supply represent approximately 3 per cent of total reimbursable cost; 
that allocated to power development represents 33 per cent. (See note, 
38 Cal.L.Rev. 728, 730, citing H.R. Doc. No. 146, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 
23 (1947) .) Federal money expended for irrigation purposes is advanced 
free of interest over long periods of time, and, in the allocation of 
repayment obligations under plans formulated by the Bureau of Reclama-
tion, irrigators are scheduled to repay the United States only 17 per 
cent of total reimbursable costs or, stated otherwise, approximately 
35 per cent of the costs allocated to irrigation. (Harding, ''Background 
of California Water g. Power Problems" (1950), 38 Cal.L.Rev. 547, 564.) 
The difference is proposed to be made up by users of project power and 
municipal and industrial water who are scheduled to pay rates designed 
to return approximately 82 per cent of total reimbursable cost. (Harding, 
op. cit., 38 Cal.L.Rev. at 564; Graham, op. cit., 38 Cal.L.Rev. at 622; 
Maass, "Administering the C.V.P." (1900), 3il Cal.L.Rev. 666, 672; 
Note, 38 Cal.L.Rev. 728, 730.) 
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\V e turn now to a consideration of the effect of the provi-
sions in the Ivanhoe contract relating to the method by which 
the district irrigators shall reimburse the federal government 
for a part of the costs incurred in construction of the federal 
project. As noted earlier, the federal government proposes 
to recover from irrigators only a portion of the construction 
costs allocated to irrigation, and the federal reclamation laws 
now provide two methods by which the United States may 
recover this amount. Under section 9 (d) of the Reclamation 
Project Ad of 1939, based on provisions contained in earlier 
reclamation laws, an organization of irrigators and the federal 
government may enter into a repayment contract by the terms 
of which the government agrees to supply water at a rate to 
be fixed by the Secretary of the Interior, and the local organ-
ization agrees to repay a fixed sum representing its share 
of total construction costs allocated to irrigation. 'l'he Secre-
tary fixes the sum of the organization's repayment obligation 
and sets the amount and number of annual installments suffi-
cient to repay the sum within 40 years. It was found that 
this method lacked flexibility (see note, 38 Cal.L.Rev. 739, 
740-741; Maass, op. cit., 38 Cal.IJ.Rev. 666, 672), and, in 
1939, section 9 (e) of the Reclamation Project Act created an 
alternative method for repayment by irrigators of the costs 
incurred by the federal government in constructing project 
units other than water distribution works located inside the 
district.4 Under contraets authorized by section 9 (e) there 
is no agreement by the irrigators to pay a definite sum within 
40 years to cover costs of project construction but, instead, the 
•section 9 (e) of the Reclamation Project Act provides as follows: 
''In lieu of entering into a repayment contract pursuant to the provi-
sions of subsection (d) of this section to cowr that part of the cost of 
the construction of works connected with water supply and allocated to 
irrigation, the Secretary, in his discretion, may enter into either short-
or long-term contracts to furnish water for irrigation purposes. Each 
such contract shall be for such period, not to exceed forty years, and 
at such rates as in the Secretary's judgment wm produce revenues at 
least sufficient to cover an appropriate share of the annual operation 
and maintenanee cost and an appropriate share of such fixed eharges as 
the Seeretary deems proper, due consideration being given to that part 
of the cost of construction of works connected with water supply and 
allocated to irrigation; and shall require payment of said rates each 
year in advance of delivery of water for said year. In the event such 
contracts are made for furnishing water for irrigation purposes, the costs 
of any irrigation water distribution works constructed by the United 
States in connection with the new project, new division of a project, 
or supplemental works on a project, shall be covered by a repayment 
contraet entered into pursuant to said subsection (d)." (53 U.S. Stat. 
1193, 61 U.S. Stat. 501, 43 U.S.C.A. § 485h(e) (Supp. 1955).) 
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under tshort or long term contraets for 
not 40 years, agrees to deliver water to 
the local organization at a rate fixed by the Secretary which 
is sufficient to include some return to the federal government 
on construction costs as well as costs of operation and main-
tenance. 
In the contract, costs incurred by the federal gov-
ermnent in a water distributing system inside 
the Ivanhoe district are covered by a 9 (d) type provision. 
The contract does not contain any express provision for 
repayment of a share of the costB of conBtructing portions of 
the project located outside the district, such as Friant Dam 
and other units of the Central Valley Project. It provides 
merely that the United States is to furniBh water and the 
diBtrict is to pay for it at an acre-foot rate to be fixed annually 
by the Secretary, in no event in excess of $3.50 per acre foot. 
It is argued that the contract is defective because there is no 
specific requirement that a definite portion of that rate shall 
be allocated to repayment of the district's share of the costs 
of constructing project facilities outside the district. How-
ever, the applicable provisions of section 9 (e) must be read 
into the contract, and they provide that the water rate fixed 
the Secretary shall be such as will produce revenue suffi-
cient to cover an appropriate share of annual operation and 
maintenance coBts ''and an appropriate share of such fixed 
as the Secretary deems proper, due consideration 
being giYen to that part of the cost of construction of works 
eomwete>d ·with \Vater supply and allocated to irrigation.'' 
It is obvious under section 9 (e) that the water rate 
to be fixed by the Secretary under the Ivanhoe contract is 
to include a construction component and that revenue pro-
duced in excess of operation and maintenance costs is to 
be treated as repayment by the district of its share of con-
struction costs, and it is immaterial that the contract does 
not specifically so direct. Any question as to this inter-
pretation of section 9 (e) must now be regarded as settled 
by a recent statute providing, among other things, that in 
administering sections 9 (d) and 9 (e), the Secretary of the 
Interior shall ''credit each year to every party which has 
entered into or which shall enter into a long-term contract 
pursuant to said subsection (e) so much of the amount paid 
by said party on or before the due date as is in excess of 
the share of the operation and maintenance costs of the 
project which the Secretary finds is properly chargeable to 
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that party. for payments heretofore made under any 
such contract shall be established by the as soon 
after the enactment of this Act as it is feasible for him 
to do so. After the sum of such credits is equal to the 
amount which have been for by the 
party if a repayment contract under (d) had 
been entered into, which amount shall be by the 
Secretary upon completion of the project concerned or as 
far in advance thereof as is feasible, no construction com-
ponent shall be included in any made for the fur-
nishing of water to the contracting party and any charges 
theretofore fixed by contract or otherwise shall be reduced 
accordingly." (Pub. L. No. 643, 84th Cong., 2d § 1 
(July 2, 1956), 70 U.S. Stat. 483-484 ( 1956).) 
It has been suggested that the 9 type of contract 
places the federal government in the role of a utility, a mere 
seller of water, and that district irrigators can never acquire 
permanent, appurtenant water rights thereunder. Such rea-
soning, however, overlooks the clear declaration has 
appeared in the reclamation law since its enactment 1902 
that "the to the use of water acquired under the provi-
sions of this Act .shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, 
'' (32 U.S. Stat. 390, 43 U.S.C.A. § It iS not 
reasonable to suppose that anything in the provisions of 
section 9 (e) has in any way altered this basic purpose of 
the reclamation law. (Of. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 
589, 614-615 S.Ct. 1332, 89 Ij.Ed. 1815].) Moreover, it 
is now expressly directed that the of the Interior, 
in administering sections 9 (d) and 9 (e), shall provide that 
the other party to any contract entered into pursuant to 
those sections "shall, during the term of the contract and 
of any renewal thereof and subject to fulfillment of all 
obligations thereunder, have a first ... to a stated 
share or quantity of the project's available water supply 
. . . and a permanent right to such share or quantity upon 
completion of payment of the amount assigned for ultimate 
return by the party, subject to payment of an appropriate 
of s-q.ch if any, as may thereafter be incurred 
by the United States in its operation and maintenance of 
the project works." The Secretary is expressly authorized 
to amend 9 contracts to make their 
conform to this act. (Pub. L. No. 643, 84th 
1(4), 2 2, 1956), 70 U.S. Stat. 483-484.) 
It has also been urged that neither 9 (e) nor the 
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I van hoe contract contains a provision authorizing renewal 
of the water delivery provisions beyond 40 years and that 
the federal government is, therefore, under no obligation to 
continue to supply water beyond the 40-year period. The 
Department of the Interior has construed the reclamation 
law to mean that construction costs allocated to irrigation 
may be recovered by means of 9 (e) contracts in any rea-
sonable period within the useful life of the project, and 
the rates presently established for the Central Valley Project 
are calculated to effect full recovery of the costs of the 
major units by the year 2009. There is nothing in section 
9 (e) which requires the recovery of all construction costs 
within 40 years or which forbids the renewal of water de-
livery contraets for periods beyond that time. This inter-
pretation must be regarded as settled by the provision recently 
added to the reclamation law which authorizes the Secretary, 
if requested by the other party thereto, to amend existing 
contracts entered into under section 9 (e) to include a pro-
vision for renewal. The Secretary is also authorized, upon 
request, to amend existing 9 (e) contracts to include a pro-
vision contemplating conversion of the 9 (e) contract into 
a 9 (d) type repayment contract at a time in the future 
when the amount remaining due the United States by the 
other party is so small that it can probably be discharged 
in annual installments within the period fixed by law for 
9 (d) contracts, i.e., at present, 40 years. (Pub. L. No. 643, 
84th Gong., 2d Sess. §~ 1 (1), 1(2), 2 (.July 2, 1956), 70 F.S. 
Stat. 483-484.) 
There is no merit in the argument that the contract is 
defective because it fails to state that, upon repayment of 
all construction costs, the district shall succeed to whatever 
title the United States has acquired to property in the dis-
trict in connection with the project. The contract provides 
that ''Title to all of the Project works, including the dis-
tribution system constructed by the United States pursuant 
to this contract, shall be and remain in the name of the 
United States until otherwise provided for by the Congress, 
notwithstanding the transfer hereafter of any such works 
to the District for operation and maintenance.'' This pro-
vision is required by the reelamation law. ( 32 U.S. Stat. 
389, 43 U.S.C.A. § 498.) 'rhere is no reason why the parties 
cannot agree that title to the project works shall remain in 
the United States after repayment of construction costs. 
The provision is a reasonable method of assuring that the 
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various properties of the project shall remain devoted to 
the purposes for which the federal funds were expended, 
and, in the absence of a showing that the provision violates 
the Constitution, or a statute or some rule of policy, we 
should not hold it to be invalid. There is nothing in the 
contract or in the reclamation law which precludes Congress 
from transferring title to project property to the district 
after all terms of the contract are performed, and it will be 
up to the district to press its claim thereto at such a time. 
It is not the business of the courts to determine whether 
the contract provision is a wise one from the standpoint of 
the district; the question is one of validity. 
The conclusions expressed above make it unnecessary to 
consider whether the Second Validating Act of 1949 (Stats. 
1949, p. 1511) is applicable to the contract. 
I would reverse the judgment. 
Traynor, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion is based upon at least two funda-
mental misconceptions of law. :B'irst, this case does not in-
volve water rights in the ordinary sense. That is, it does not 
involve questions relating to the right to divert and use water 
from a stream or other source; questions of priority or 
riparian ownership or beneficial use of water as defined in 
our statutes and court decisions. It involves the validity of 
a contract between the government of the United States and 
an irrigation district organized and existing under the laws 
of this state. 
Second, even if the law relating to water rights were in-
volved, the theory enunciated in the majority opinion of title 
to all domestic water being held in trust by the state is funda-
mentally unsound and unsupported in law, tradition, history, 
public policy, practice or human experience. 
A brief statement relative to the origin and development of 
the Central Valley Project and its objectives will demonstrate 
that the contract here involved was entered into in accordance 
with federal and state law and is therefore valid. 
The Central Valley Project was originally authorized by 
the State of California for construction by its Water Project 
Authority under the Central Valley Project Act of 1933 (Cal. 
Stats. 1933, § 1042, p. 2643, effective after referendum action, 
.January 13, 1934, now Wat. Code, § 11100 et seq.). No action 
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wa,; taken Authorit~· for the construc-
tion of this but on September 1935, President 
Roosevelt, by executin: or(ler, transferred $20,000,000 under 
the :B'ederal Emergeney Helid Appropriation Act of 1935 to 
the Department of the Interior, Reclamation Service, for 
eonstruction of Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River. The 
projeet was thereafter eonstrueted as a reclamation projeet 
to the Heelamation Aet above referred to and acts 
amendatory thereto. There is no question but that the United 
States government complied with all of the provisions of the 
law of California in the acquisition of the water rights inci-
dent to this project and that the construction, operation and 
maintenance of the storage darns and facilities are in every 
respect in accordance with the laws of this state. It is like-
wise clear that this project was constructed in accordance 
with the laws of the United States and that the authority 
exercised by the Heelamation Service in storing and distrib-
uting the water developed by said project is strictly in accord 
with both the laws of the United States and of the State of 
California. Such being the case, we must look to these laws 
to determine whether or not the state agency involved in this 
case had the authority to enter into a contract with the United 
States government for the purchase of the water developed by 
said project. There is no question but that both the federal 
and state laws authorize the execution of such contracts. So 
far as our state law is concerned, the contract here involved 
is expressly authorized by the Irrigation District Federal 
Cooperation Law (Wat. Code, § 23175 et seq.) of this state 
which authorizes a state agency to contract with the United 
States for a 1vater supply (W at. Code, § 23196a), and to 
deliver, distribute, and apportion this supply as required by 
federal law (Wat. Code, §§ 23197a, 23200). 
The contract here involved is also expressly authorized by 
the federal laws relating to the reclamation of arid lands of 
the west, and particularly by section 9 (e) of the Reclamation 
Project Act of 1939 (33 Stats. 1939, p. 1196, 43 U.S.C., 
§ 485h (e) 1946 F'.R.LA. 600), and section 46 of the Omnibus 
Adjustment Act of 1926 ( 46 Stats. of 1926, p. 649, 43 U.S. C., 
§ 423e 1946 F .R.L.A. 318). These laws, in themselves, and 
in conjunction with the state laws do not deprive anyone of 
property without due process of law, nor deny to anyone equal 
protection of the laws, and do not derogate from the powers 
reserved to the state under the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. 
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There is no of law in this state which imposes 
any restriction against an agency of this state from entering 
into a contract with the United States the subject 
matter of the contract here under consideraion. The 160-acre 
limitation for the use of water from a reclamation project has 
been in existence since 1902 and this has never been 
successfully assailed as impinging any constitutional of 
anyone who has been called upon to with the provi-
sions of the Reclamation Act. 
We are not here concerned with the social and economic 
philosophy which was the background of the inclusion of the 
160-acre limitation in the Heclamation Act. It is not our 
province to declare whether this provision of law is good or 
bad. It was adopted Congress after many years of debate, 
and although numerous assaults have been made against it, 
Congress has not only refused to delete it from the act but 
has on two occasions, once in 1926 and again in 1939, expressly 
reaffirmed their belief in the wisdom of this provision. Neither 
has the Legislature of California seen fit to disapprove the 
inclusion of this provision in the contracts which it has 
authorized state agencies to negotiate with the United States 
government for the distribution of water from reclamation 
projects. The fact that in the case here involved the inhabi-
tants of the district which nrgotiated the contract containing 
the 160-acre limitation, voted overwhelmingly in favor of said 
contract, should be persuasive evidencr that the provision 
is not detrimental to the social and economic welfare of the 
people affected by it. 
"\Vith respect to the title to the unappropriated waters of 
this state, the statutes of this state declare that ''The sover-
eignty of the State resides in the people thereof .... " (Gov. 
Code, § 100), and that "All property within the limits of 
the State, which does not belong to any person, belongs to 
the people" (Gov. Code, § 182). Since the povver of sover-
eignty is vested in the people, and all property within the 
limits of the state, which dors not belong to any person, be-
longs to the people, it follows that the unappropriated waters 
of the state are owned by the people under their power of 
sovereignty. The people have, through the Constitution, dele-
gatrd this power to the executive and lrgislative branches of 
the government. The Legislature of this state has provided 
by law a eomprehensive system for the appropriation, distri-
bution and use of the waters of this state, including the 
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impounding and storage of the seasonal run-off for distribu-
tion and use for beneficial purposes. I refer to the \Vater 
Code of this state adopted by the Legislature in 1943 which 
contains the following provisions (among others) with respect 
to the ownership, appropriation and use of the domestic 
waters of this state: 
'' 102. All water within the State is the property of the 
people of the State, but the right to the usc of water may be 
acquired by appropriation in the manner provided by law. 
'' 103. In the enactment of this code the Legislature does 
not intend thereby to effect any change in the law relating 
to water rights. 
"104. It is hereby declared that the people of the State 
have a paramount interest in the use of all the water of the 
State and that the State shall determine what water of the 
State, surface and underground, can be converted to public 
use or controlled for public protection. 
"105. It is hereby declared that the protection of the 
public interest in the development of the water resources of 
the State is of vital concern to the people of the State and 
that the State shall determine in what way the water of the 
State, both surface and underground, should be developed for 
the greatest public benefit. 
"106. It is hereby declared to be the established policy of 
this State that the use of water for domestic purposes is the 
highest use of water and that the next highest use is for 
irrigation." (W at. Code, § § 102, 103, 104, 105, and 106.) 
In the adoption of the state \Vater Code, the Legislature 
has made it abundantly clear that anyone complying with the 
laws of this state may be granted a right to appropriate and 
use any unappropriated water which he can put to a bene-
ficial use. 'I'he government of the United States, acting under 
valid acts of Congress, may beeome an appropriator of any 
of the unappropriated waters of this state the same as any 
other public or private corporation or individual who com-
plies with the law of this state governing the appropriation 
and use of such waters. 
After reviewing the history of the water law of California 
the majority opinion states: "It is therefore concluded that 
the title to the unappropriat(•d waters of the state is in the 
State of California in trnst fM thr nse and benefit of the 
beneficiaries of that trust; that the trust eharacter of that 
title is anchorc<1 in the state by eonstitntional provisions, by 
statutes enacted in fnrthcran(:e thereof, an(l by the decisional 
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law of the ~tate .... '' The majority opinion doe~ not cite 
any constitutional or statutory provision or any decision of 
any court of this state which supports the foregoing statement. 
On the contrary there is not a single constitutional or statu-
tory provision or decision of any court of this state from 
which it is possible to draw such couelusion. The words trust 
or trustee or trust relationship do not appear in any consti-
tutional or statutory provision or any court decision of this 
state dealing with the title or ownership of water by the State 
of California. 
The reasoning of the majority with respect to the right 
of the beneficiaries under the so-called trust to the beneficial 
use of water seems incoherent. It proceeds from the premise 
'' ... that the title to the unappropriated domestic waters 
of the state is in the State of California in trust for the use 
and benefit of the beneficiaries of that trust; ... that the 
beneficiaries of that trust are the water users of the state who 
in a general sense constit1de all of the people of the state; 
that the beneficiaries of the trust relationship whose rights 
are here under consideration are those present or prospective 
users who individually or in properly classified groups bring 
themselves within the orbit of the state law under which they 
may be in position to demand benefits without discrimination, 
and that within that category are the landowners of the 
district.'' (Emphasis added.) 
Under the foregoing line of reasoning no vested right may 
ever be acquired by any individual or group of individuals to 
appropriate and use a given quantity of water for a beneficial 
purpose even though they have complied with all the pro-
visions of the statutory law of this state, as the state would 
have no power to grant a specific right to any individual 
unless every other individual who may have a use for water 
has received his share. The following practical example may 
demonstrate the absurdity of the reasoning of the majority. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that there are vast areas 
of land in this state which have no available water supply. 
Under existing law, ho·wever, an individual or group of in-
dividuals may acquire a right to develop a water supply from 
unappropriated waters (see Wat. Code, §§ 1252, 1252.5, 1253, 
1350, 1375, 1380, 1390, 1450, 1455) by pumping from wells or 
storage of run-off which may be adequate to supply the limited 
areas owned by those who develop such supply. However, 
there may be other areas in the same locality for which no 
water is available because of the prior appropriation and 
v. ALL PARTIES f47 C.2d 
available to those who first 
with the installation of 
and use of the entire available 
supply. It is obvious that under the trust theory advanced 
in the opinion, the state could not grant a right to 
one user which would another of his share even 
the first was devoting all of the available 
water to a beneficial use on his land. In this connection the 
majority opinion states, ''The trust relationship existing 
between the state and the beneficiaries of the trust must 
therefore be kept in mind in connection with any transactions 
between the state or any of its agencies and outside parties. 
It follows that when an outside party, such as the United 
States, by contract, legislation or otherwise, steps into the 
shoes of the state to administer that trust by the develop-
ment, conservation and distribution of the trust res, it is 
bound by the same rules of law as surround and govern the 
State of California or any other purveyor of water of the 
state for the benefit of its water users. The state may not 
therefore lawfully dispossess itself of the title to such water 
and may not surrender its control of the same in any way 
inconsistent with the administration of the trust under which 
the title is held. The state by general law may and has in 
the main prescribed the terms and conditions under which 
the several classes of water users may become secure in their 
r·ight to the water and use thereof." (Emphasis added.) 
But the state has not classified water users nor prescribed the 
terms and conditions under which they may become secure 
in their right to the water and use thereof on any theory of 
trust relationship between it and the users. On the other hand 
the state has provided that an individual or group of in-
dividuals may obtain a permit to appropriate and use a specific 
quantity of water, and to the extent that such appropriation 
is prior in time, it is prior in right to other appropriations 
and constitutes a vested right protected by the due process 
clauses of both the state and federal Constitutions. (See \Vat. 
Code, §§ 1450, 1455; 'l'emescal Wate1· Co. v. Department of 
Public Works, 44 Cal.2d 90 [280 P.2d 1].) In this con-
nection, the Water Code provides (see W at. Code, § 1252.5) 
that the government of the United States may acquire a 
water right by appropriation in the same manner as any 
individual or corporation. The foregoing provisions of the 
Water Code are in clear conflict with the so-called trust 
theory advanced in the majority opinion. It should be 
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perfectly obvious that the provisions of the Water Code 
above cited which confer a vested right upon appropriators 
of water, including the ·united States, cannot stand in the 
face of the holding of the here that state holds 
the title to all the of the 
state in trust for all of the ·\Yater nsers 
emmot he denied that the effeet of the 
Code which authorize the of 
propriation and use of the unappropriated 
state by indidduals and private anrl publi\' 
eluding the United States, is to deprive some 
eiaries of the trust of their share of the trust 
the first ronw, first served policy with 
propriation of the nnappropriated dornestie 
as it 
of the Water 
for the ap-
waters of the 
Ill-
of the benefi-
state as deelared in the \Vater Codr. rrhe majority opinion 
expressly states that "The state may uot t heref:ore lawfully 
dispossess itself of the title to sneh water [unappropriated 
domestic water] and may not surrender its control of the 
same in any way inconsistent with the achninistration of the 
trust under which the title is held.'' 'I' he inevitable con-
clusion which mnst be reached from thr reasoning of the 
majority opi11ion is that all unappropriated domestic waters 
of the state are held in trnst for the nRe of all of the people 
of the state who arc in a position to put their respective shares 
of the water to a beneficial use and that sn<:h benefieiaries 
have the right to demand and receive their respective shares 
of such water as beneficiaries of said trust. In this conn!'etion 
the majority states "It is they who are in a position to avail 
themselVPs of the right to beneficial use of the waters to he 
purveyed and to demand indiscriminate service.'' 
It must he remembered that there is no provision in either 
the state or federal law which purports to allorate auy portion 
of the ·water deYeloped by the Central Valley Project to the 
plaintiff in this action or to any other agency, group or in-
dividual. The allocation and c1istribntion of said water is a 
matter to be provided for by eontraet entere(l into pnrsuant 
to the provisions of the federal anil state laws on this subject. 
After reviewing its trust relationship theory the majority 
opinion states "There is nothing- in the foreg-oing declaration 
[ trnst relationship between si ate and present or prospective 
water users] wJ1ieh intPrjeets anything- new into the water 
law of this state. It is hnt a reeognition an1l TPdc<~laration of 
("Xisting fnndamrnta1 eoneepts of this of our law." 
If the majority is aware of any prior deelaration of this 
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or any other court of this state invoking the trust relationship 
concept to state-owned \Yater rights it has failed to disclose 
the source or location of such declaration. -While it may not 
be new to the majority, it is both new and novel to me and 
is basically unsound. 
The only authorities upon which the majority rely for 
the so-called trust relationship are the following: 211 erchants 
Nat. Bank v. Escondido In·. Dist., 144 Cal. 329 [77 P. 937]; 
Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Collins, 154 Cal. 440 [97 P. 1124] ; Hall 
v. Super·ior Court, 198 Cal. 373 [245 P. 814]; Lindsay-Strath-
more Irr. Dist. v. Wutchumna W. Co., 111 Cal.App. 688 
[296 P. 933] ; L-illen v. Hussey, 101 Cal.App.2d 457 [225 
P. 674]. None of these cases even mentions the question of 
title or ownership of the unappropriated domestic waters 
of the State of California. They deal exclusively with the 
rights of landowners within irrigation districts to receive 
their respective proportions of the water which the irrigation 
district has acquired for the use and benefit of the lands 
within the district. It is obvious that in administering the 
distribution of water to landowners within an irrigation 
district, the district is acting as a trustee and the landowner 
a beneficiary, as the landowner supplies the funds which 
enable the district to acquire and distribute the water, and 
the district should be required to distribute available water 
to landowners on a fair and equitable basis so that there 
will be no discrimination between them. It is clear that 
the landowner within an irrigation district has no property 
right in any particular quantity of water, as the title to 
the water is vested in the irrigation district which is required 
to distribute it to the landowners in accordance with the 
latters' needs. The situation with respect to the ownership 
of unappropriated domestic water by the state is entirely 
different. The state does not undertake to distribute any 
particular quantity of water to anyone. It has established 
an agency (the Division of Water Resources) to determine 
the quantity of water available and to grant permits for the 
use of such water to those making application therefor in 
accordance with the law. There is no provision of law re-
quiring the Division of vVater Resources to supervise the 
distribution of water covered by permits issued by said divi-
sion, and if the right of the permittee is violated by a third 
person, he must resort to the courts for the enforcement of 
his right. The Water Code makes it crystal clear that anyone 
complying with its provisions may acquire the right to use 
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water by appropriation in the manner provided by law. 
(See W at. Code, § 102.) The right so aequired is a property 
right and protected by the due process clauses of both the 
state and federal Constitutions. 
The concept of the trust character of title to the domestic 
waters of this state being vested in the State of California 
as enunciated in the majority opinion is clearly out of 
harmony not only with the Constitution and statutes of this 
state but with the decisional law as well. This is demonstrated 
by the discussion in the majority opinion relative to the 
development of the law relating to water rights in this state. 
At the beginning of this discussion the majority opinion 
refers to the case of Lux v. Haggin decided by this court in 
1886 ( 69 Cal. 255). Referring to the holding of this court 
in Lux v. Haggin, supra, the majority states: "'fhe doctrine 
was declared to be that the owner of real property bordering 
such a river or stream had a right co-existent with the same 
rights of other landowners on the stream, to the use of its 
waters and the flow thereof as it was 'wont to do in the 
course of nature' unimpaired in quality and undiminished 
in quantity. 'l'his right was declared by this court in Lux 
v. Haggin, supra, 69 Cal. 255, to be a right appurtenant to 
the land, in fact a part and parcel of the land itself. Under 
this doctrine the riparian owner had the right to insist that 
the full flow of the stream continue to pass his land in its 
natural state whether he needed the water or not. This 
riparian right as so defined was declared by this eourt to 
be a property right which vested in the riparian owner and 
as such was protected by the state and federal Constitutions. 
It could not be limited or impaired without due process of 
law and without just compensation." It is conceded by 
the majority that the rule announced in Lux v. Haggin, supra, 
continued to be the rule of decision in this state until 1933 
when this court was persuaded by opinions prepared by 
the facile pen of Mr. Justice Shenk (see Gin S. Chow v. 
City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673 [22 P.2d 5] ; Peabody 
v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal.2d 351 [40 P.2d 486]) to hold that 
this doctrine was no longer applicable and was supplanted 
by the doctrine of reasonable use even as against appro-
priators. It should be noted that the theory of the trust 
character of title to water rights had not then been con-
ceived by Mr. Justice Shenk as no mention was made of 
this theory until now. It would seem, however, that if the 
state ever held the title to the domestic waters of this state 
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so from the ; that from the 
time the state was admittPd into the union and berame an 
entity capable of ownership and possession of 
property. The majority here do not claim that this trust 
theory of title to water originated with the adoption 
of the Water Commission Act in 1913 or the adoption of 
the amemlment to the Constitution in 1928 (Cal. Const., art. 
XIV, § 3) or with the sweeping pronouncements contained 
in the decisions of this court in the Gin Chow and Peabody 
cases. 'rhis theory must have originated and come into being 
when the Constitution of 1849 was adopted and existed at 
the time this court decided Lux v. Haggin, supra, in 1886, 
and during all of the intervening years when this court 
was applying the doctrine announced in Lux v. Haggin. Such 
being the case, can it be said that the doctrine of Lux v. 
II aggin and all of the other decisions of this court in water 
rights cases bet·ween 1886 and the decision of the Gin Chow 
ease in 1933 is compatible with the theory that the State 
of California held the title to the domestic waters of the 
state in trust for water users who are said to be the bene-
ficiaries of the so-called trust. The answer is obvious. The 
declaration of the riparian rig-ht doctrine in Lux v. Haggin, 
sttpra, is clearly repugnant to any trust concept. Under 
this doctrine the riparian owner got title to the riparian 
right when a patent was issuerl to him for his riparian land 
whether that patent came from the state or federal govern-
ment. Under this doctrine the right to have the full flow 
of the stream past his land unimpaired in quality and 
undiminished in quantity except by the reasonable use of 
another riparian owner, was a vested right, a part and parcel 
of the land itself and protected by the due procPss clauses 
of both the state and federal Constitutions. (Miller & Lu,x 
v. Madera Ca,nal etc. Co .. 155 Cal. 59 [99 P. 502, 22 I1.R.A.N.S. 
391].) While the majority opinion does not purport to 
express or declare what was the genesis of the so-called trust 
title theory, there are declarations in said opinion from 
which an inference might be drawn that the Water Com-
mission Act plus the 1928 constitutional amendment plus 
the doctrine announced in the Gin Chow and Peabody cases 
gave rise to such theory. After discussing the effect of the 
foregoing the majority opinion states: "It is thus apparent 
that the more recent changes in the constitutional and de-
cisional law of this state had the effect of making available 
for beneficial uses by appropriation and other means great 
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volumes of waters of state." I have 
difficulty attempting to rationalize the statement. 
If the state Her had title to the waters referred to, it never 
lost it. If it did not have title to said waters, the title must 
have been vested in others. If it was vested in others, the 
only manner in which it could acquire title thereto was by 
purchase or the exercise of its power of eminent domain 
unless the users voluntarily abandoned the waters and made 
them available for appropriation and use by others. Cer-
tainly, the I,egislature could not by statute nor the people 
by the adoption of a constitutional amendment nor could 
this court by a valid rule of decision divest an owner of a 
valid title to a water right any more than any of those de-
partments of government could validly divest an owner of 
private property of his title to lands or personal belongings. 
What really happened in this melee of incongruity is that 
this court saw fit to change the riparian right doctrine from 
that announced in Lux v. Haggin, supra, to the so-called 
reasonable use doctrine as announced in the Gin Chow and 
Peabody cases by holding that the Dux v. Hagg1:n doctrine 
had become outmoded and was not adapted to the arid con-
ditions existing in this state. What this court did in the 
said last mentioned decisions had the effect of overruling 
all of the former decisions of this court from Lux v. Haggin 
in 1886 to Herminghaus v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 200 
Cal. 81 [252 P. 607], decided in 1926, as it is obvious that 
said rule could not be changed without overruling said cases 
which had held that the riparian right doctrine as announced 
in Lux v. H aggin was a vested property right protected by 
the due process clauses of both the federal and state Con-
stitutions. What Mr. Justice Shenk did in the Peabody and 
Gin Chow cases was simply to ignore the holding of this 
court in Miller & L~tx v. Madera Canal rte. Co .. 155 Cal. 59 
[99 P. 502], by holding that the doctrine of reasonable use 
even as against an appropriator did not violate the due 
process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. I have 
heretofore stated that I would have arrived at the same con-
clusion by forthrightly overruling all of the decisions of 
this court applying the Lux v. Haggin doctrine as being un-
sound in principle and based upon a misapprehension of 
the law applicable to water rights (see dissenting opinion 
in City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal.2d 908, at 
p. 938 [207 P.2d 17]). 
47 C.2d-22 
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The corre(~tly states that the decision 
of this court in ]JILT v. llaggin .. mpra, was based upon the 
declaration contained in seetion 4468 of the Political Code 
which provided at that time as follows: "The common law 
of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent 
with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitu-
tion or laws of the State of California, shall be the rule of 
decision in all the courts of this state." But the majority 
opinion is in error when it states: ''This court took the 
general language of that declaration by its four corners and 
applied the English common law doctrine of riparian rights 
to the ownership, control and use of the waters of the rivers 
and streams of the state.'' 'While it is true that the majority 
of this court in its opinion in Lux v. Haggin, supra, assumed 
that the riparian right doctrine as there declared was based 
upon the common law of England, such assumption was 
erroneous and without foundation in fact or law as there 
now appears to be no doubt that the riparian right doctrine 
was not a part of the common law of England but a part 
of the civil law and the first reference to it is contained in 
the Code Napoleon, the French Civil Code, in the year 1804. 
The first decision announcing the riparian right doctrine 
in any common law country was the case of Tyler v. Wilkin-
son, 4 Mason 397 [F. Cas. No. 14312], which was written by 
Mr. Justice Story of the Supreme Court of the United States 
while sitting as a circuit judge in the Rhode Island circuit 
in the June term of 1827. The first case involving the ri-
parian right doctrine in England was decided in 1849 and 
referred to Tyler v. Wilkinson as its authority. My authority 
for the foregoing statement is an article written by Mr. 
Samuel C. Wiel of the California Bar, an eminent authority 
on water law, author of the text "Water Law in the ·western 
States" and various other publications on water law. This 
article was published in the Harvard Law Review, Volume 
XXXIII, Number 2, in 1920. 
The fallacy underlying the basis for the decision of this 
court in Lttx v. Haggin, sttpra, has permeated numerous 
decisions of this conrt and is no doubt the reason for much 
of the confusion which has been brought about as the result 
of the judicial fumbling and bungling of the water laws of 
this state (see dissenting opinion in City of Pasadena v. City 
of Alhambra, 33 Cal.2d 908, at 938 [207 P.2d 17]). 
Returning to the so-called trust title theory of water rights, 
the majority opinion does not purport to delineate the terms 
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of the so-called trust. But in view of the position taken by 
the majority that the domestic waters, the title to which 
is held in trust by the state, must be administered in ac-
eordanee with the statutory and decisional law of the state, 
we may assume that such law may be resorted to for the 
purpose of ascertaining the terms of the trust. If such is 
the case, it would seem that the terms of such trust may be 
changed at every session of the Ijegislature or during every 
period that a new group of justices constitutes a majority 
of the Supreme Court of this state. In other words this 
so-called trust character of the title to the domestic waters 
of this state, has no stability whatsoever and may be changed 
from decade to deeade or from year to year as may be dictated 
by the political fortunes of those who declare and administer 
it. 
The record in this case discloses that in the construction 
and operation of the units of the Central Valley Project 
the United States through its Bureau of Reclamation has 
acquired by purchase and the exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain vast areas of privately owned lands and numerous 
water rights some of which were based upon filings of ap-
plications for the appropriation of unappropriated waters 
by the State of California and various agencies of the state 
such as irrigation districts and municipal water districts 
and also from many private individuals and corporations 
which claimed to own vested rights in the domestic waters 
of this state both as appropriators and riparian owners. 
Included among the agencies from which such rights were 
acquired by the United States are Madera Irrigation District, 
Tranquility Irrigation District, J amrs Irrigation District, 
and the following private or quasi-public corporations: Miller 
and Lux, Inc., Gravelly Ford Canal Company, Kings River 
Canal and Irrigation Company, Columbia Canal Company, 
San Ijuis Canal Company, Firebaugh Canal Company, Ger-
lach Live Stock Company, Hollister Land and Canal Com-
pany, Chowchilla Farms, Inc., Edison Securities Company 
and many other corporations and individuals. '\Vhile the 
consideration paid by the United. States for the rights ac-
quired from the above public agencirs, corporations and 
individuals is not disclosed, it appears, that the sum of 
$2,450,000 was paid to Miller anrl T1nx. Ine .. for title to all 
of the waters of the San ,Joaquin Rivrr in rxeess of flows 
specified in schedules attached to the agreempnt of purchase 
(see Report Prepared Pursuant to Senate Concurrent Reso-
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lution Number 48, Legislature of 1951, introduced in evidence 
as Water Project 's Exhibit N.) 
If the majority is right in holding that the title in all of 
the water rights acquired by the United States in connection 
with the construction, development and operation of the 
Central Valley Project is held in trust for the water users 
of this state, such holding must be based upon the premise 
that all of so were held in trust by the 
owners of such rights who conveyed the same to the United 
States. This would apply to the vast riparian right holdings 
of Miller and Lux, Inc., whieh were adjudicated by numerous 
decisions of this court as being a part and parcel of the 
lands of said corporation, title to which was vouchsafed 
by the due process clauses of both the federal and state Con-
stitutions. 
vVhile there can be no question that the Supreme Court of 
the United States has held in many eases that the matter of 
ownership, distribution and use of water, with few limited 
exreptions, is -.,yithin the jurisdietion of the state and the 
d('termination of the right to appropriate and use water is 
controlled by state law (Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 93-94 
127 S.Ct. 655, 51 IJ.Ed. 956] ; Unitecl States v. Arizona, 295 
U.S. 174 155 S.Ct. 666, 79 L.Ed. 1371]; Unitecl States v. 
Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 [70 S.Ct. 955, 94 IJ.Ed. 
1231]), rerent deeisions of that court make it clear that there 
are certain fields in which the federal law prevails over the 
state and that the state's control of the waters within the 
state is not complete and unqualified (see United States v. 
San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 [60 S.Ct. 749, 84 hEd. 1050] ; 
First Iowa Hyclro-Electn'c Coop. v. Federal Powm· Corn., 328 
U.S. 152 [66 S.Ct. 906, 90 L.Ed. 1143] ; Henry Ford & Son 
v. Little Falls Fibre Co., 280 U.S. 369 [50 S.Ct. 140, 74 L.Ed. 
483]; Federal Power Com. v. Niagara JJ1ohawk Power Corp., 
347 1J.S. 239 [74 S.Ct. 487, 98 hEd. 666]; Federal Power 
Corn. v. State of On;gon, 349 U.S. 435 f75 S.Ct. 832, 99 hEd. 
1215]; State of Wash. Drpt. Garne v. Federal Power Corn., 
207 1<'.2(1 891; Alabama Powf'r Co. v. (htlf Power Co., 283 F. 
606; California Orcrton Pou'e1· Co. v. Snpe1·ior Court, 45 Cal.2d 
858 [291 P.2d 4fi5l ). Tt seems elrar, that in the 
of the units of the Central Valley 
Projeet thP StaJpq under the provi:sions 
of the n('(·lmnai ion Ad U.S. C.,§ 7::!1 Req.) aud with full 
reeognition of th(' waiPI" rights there involved having valid 
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94 L.Ed. 1281]). 
It is a matter of tommon that there are thou-
sands, probably mill ions of acres of land in California which 
are still in ownership and vast water resources 
exist in these regions. As I read the recent decisions of the 
Supreme Court or the llnited I have little doubt that 
under the rnle:s o[ law mmoum~ed the federal govern-
ment rnay exereise exdusive eontrol over the water 
resourees whid1 exist ou lauds and in areas owned and con-
trolled by it. l refer to the national forests aud the undevel-
oped area:-; of thi:,; state whieh remain almost exdusively in 
government ownership and eontrol. 
\V e may take judicial uotiee that the federal government 
is now engaged in the eoustruetion of another large reelama-
tion project which will be anuexed to and contribute to the 
water resourc~es of the Central Valley Projed. I refer to the 
'rrinity River Project which eontemplates the eonstruction 
of a dam 46[) feet high on the Trinity River near \Veaverville 
in 'rrinity County, \vhieh will impound the run-off of the 
Trinity l~iver watershed and will ha\·e a eapaeity of approxi-
mately 2,500,000 acre feet of storage. More than 75 per cent 
of the 450,000 aeres of land embraced within this project is 
owned by the United States government. \Vhen this dam is 
eompleted and the water therefrom discharged into the Saera-
mento !liver basin, the t'nitcd States government will no 
doubt proceed to di:,;pose of it in aeeordanee with the laws of 
the United States including the 160-aere limitation in the 
Reclamation Aet. It does not seem reasonable and logical 
to me that this court should say to the government of the 
United States that you eannot impound the waters of the 
'rrinity River basin which are now running to waste and 
causing innm~asurahle flood damage, and divert it into areas 
where it may be used for the inigation and improvement of 
arid lands and other useful purposes unless you eliminate 
from your eontracts for the distribution of this water the 
160-acre limitation whieh the Congress of the United States 
has said must be included in sueh eontraets. Yet, this require-
ment must flow from the holding of the majority here even 
though the water mai!e available by said project is produced 
from a drainage basin, 75 per cent of the area of which is 
owned by the United States. 
It is my view that when the United States eonstructs a 
reclamation project by impounding water in compliance with 
678 [YA:\HOE fRR. DTRT. 1'. AB, PAHTIES [47 C.2d 
both statn and federallawc-:, it is the owner of that water and 
may dispose of it as provided h~r federal law, and it may exact 
any condition ·whi(·h the federal law sees fit to provide for in 
conneetion with the sale and distribution of that water. Of 
eourse this does not mean that Congress eonld impose restric-
tions in eonfliet with constitutional prineiples. It may be 
that the State of Califomia by l<>gislativc aetion could so 
restrid the appropriation of its water resourees that the fed-
eral government ·would not see fit to develop further reclama-
tion projects in this state, but so long as the federal govern-
ment complies 1dth the law of the State of California in the 
eonsteuetion, operation and maintenance of its reclamation 
projeets, 1 am dispos(:<l to hold that it may sell and distribute 
the water developed by said projects under eontraets of the 
type here invotn:d whieh, in my opinion, do not violate any 
provision of the Constitution and laws of this state or the 
Constitution and laws of the United States. 
We have here no eontroversy between the State of Cali-
fornia and the United States. The attorney gew;ral of Cali-
fornia takes the position that the eontraets here involved are 
valid. 'fhc agencies here involved have all aecepted and 
approved these eontraets both by their governing boards and 
the inhabitants of the districts affected thereby. '!.'he validity 
of these contracts is ehallengecl only by individuals who claim 
that their property rights will be affected thereby. I do not 
agree . 
.At the outset of this opinion I stated that the majority 
opinion is based upon two fundamental misconceptions. I then 
called attention to the fact that the majority opinion is writ-
ten upon the assumption that this is a case involving water 
rights and that the State of California holds title to all of the 
domestic waters of the state in trust. 1 think it proper to 
add another fundamental misconception on which the majority 
opinion is based; that is, that the so-called lGO-acrc limitation 
is in effcet an excess land law. \Vith this concept I do not 
agree. In an excellent artide by Professor Paul S. Taylor, 
Professor of J<Jconomics, UniYersity of California, printed in 
the Yale Law Journal, Volume 64, Kmnber 4, February, 1955, 
entitled "The E:r.ccss Land Law: Execution of a Public 
Policy," he states in part: 
''.A great confusion pervades discussion of the excess land 
law and threatens disaster to public policy regarding dis-
posing of public domain. Congress has declared this policy 
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to be the widespread diRtribution of benefits, and the curbing 
of monopoly and speculation, whether the domain is in form 
of land, water, or both. The exceRs land provision of the 
National Reclamation Act of 1902 is a means of attaining 
these ends in the public disposal of water. 
''General and legal aeeeptance have joined to eonfer au-
thority upon eitlwr of two deseriptivo titles--' excess laud law' 
or '160-aere limitation '-both of them equally deeeptiYE'. The 
law is not really a land law, and it places no limitation what-
soever upon the acreage a man may O\Yn. The restraint is 
neither upon acreage of land nor upon water, but upon the 
individual. No individual is entitled to receive more than an 
equitable share of the water distributed under reclamation 
law. The maximum individual share is set at an amount of 
water necessary to irrigate 160 acres of land. 
''Among the sourees of this confusion of language, two are 
'accidents '-one physical, the other historical. The first is 
the unequal geographical distribution of water. \Vater and 
land are two halves of a productive whole everywhere. East 
of the one hundredth meridian nature has joined them, and 
any description or analysis of agricultural land can assume 
water. \Vest of the hundredth meriflian water and land are 
separate. Man-made works-reservoirs and canals-are re-
quired to join thrm. vVater and land, therefore, must be 
treated separately, whether as physical entities, objects of 
private ownership, or the concern of public policy. \Vater 
cannot be assumed as the natural, inevitable and permanent 
adjunct of land.. Land ownership does not cqnal water owner· 
ship west of the hunnrE'dth meridian. 
''The second source of confusion is an historical accident. 
Policy was debated and formulated in the nineteenth century 
when settlement was still east of the hundredth meridian, 
and water was not a concern. The great legislative land-
marks in the nation's policy favoring actual settlers are land 
laws-the Pre-emption Act of 1841 and the Homestead Act 
of 1862. After these acts were passE'd, settlement crossed 
the hundredth meridian, and water berame the primary con-
cern. General policy was not altered with the movement 
to the arid belt, but the techniques and devices for imple-
menting it had to change. The artificial nnion of land and 
water required more eomplcx thonght and language than was 
necessary where land and ·water are joined naturally. The 
means of applying pnblie poliey to water had to be de-
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clared separately, spelled out in new terms. Chief among 
the new techniques \Yas the excess land law. 
"It took something of a mental wrench to turn American 
lawmakers and administrators from land policy to water 
policy. The natural tendency was to cany over the language 
of earlier land problems to the more complex problems of 
water. A result of this inertia has been confusion in thought 
as well as in language west of the hundredth meridian, where 
thinking in terms of land policy overemphasizes land and 
underemphasizes water. Some persons have found it ad-
vantageous to exploit the confusion. Those who achieved what 
Major Powell called 'monopoly of land' utilize this habit of 
thinking in terms of land policy to confuse the public, to 
suggest that private landowners have a moral claim to water 
in proportion to their landholdings whatever their size, and 
to defeat the efforts of legislators who seek equitable distribu-
tion of water among individuals. Even administrators do not 
find it easy to remember that the essential question is not, 
who owns the land, but who gets the water. 
"The fact of importance above all others in federal recla-
mation is that the landowner calls upon the government to 
provide him with water. It is for Congress representing the 
general interest, and not for the landowner, to say upon 
what terms, in what amount, and in accord with what policy 
the public will supply water. This is a first principle in-
herent in a relationship between the public that gives and 
an individual who receives. The concern of the law is to 
distribute water equitably among individual landowners, not 
-except below 160 acres-in proportion to their holdings of 
land. This principle is accepted without question by most 
landholders seeking water under reclamation law; the few 
who object usually are holders of excess land.'' 
I am in full accord with the views expressed by Professor 
Taylor and commend the reading of his article in full by 
those who are interested in this subject. 
Since the majority opinion is based upon the wholly un-
sound and unsupported assumption that the title to the water 
rights acquired by the United States in the construction, 
development and operation of the Central Valley Project 
are held in trust for the use and benefit of the water users 
of California anrl that the title to such rights is therefore 
restricted to the extent that the United States may not dis-
pose of such water pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902 
and acts amendatory thereto containing the so-called 160-
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aere limitation, it follows that the conclusion reached by the 
majority that the contract here iu,-olved deprives certain 
landowners within the plaintiff irrigation district of vested 
rights without due process of law and without just compensa-
tion is equally unsound and unsupported. 
For the reasons hereinabove stated I would reverse the 
judgment. 
'l'he petition of defendant and appellant for a rehearing 
1ras denied February 19, 1957. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and 
'l'raynor, .J., were of the opinion that the petition should be 
granted. 
[Sac. No. 6489. In Bank. Jan. 24, 1957.] 
MADERA IRRIGATIO~ DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appel-
lant, v. ALL PEHSONS, etc., Defendants; JOHN 
HUMPHREYS et al., Hespondents; 'l'IIE PEOPLE 
et al., Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] Waters-Irrigation Districts-Contracts: Property and Water 
Rights.-A contract between an irrig-ation district and the 
United States by which the United States undertook to deliver 
water for irrigation purposes from the Central Valley Project 
to the district and to expend funds for the construction of a 
distribution system within the district is ineffectiYe where it 
deprives landowners of the distriet of yested rights as members 
of the class who are beneficiaries of the trust under whieh the 
United States acquired appropriatiYe rights to domestic waters 
of the state, deprives "larg-e landowners" of rights to waters 
for their lands in excess of 160 acres, grants the United 
States the right to distribute water for irrigation at a price 
without eompliance with laws of the state relating to distribu-
tion of its domestic water, reserves to the United States the 
right to determine at its own discretion whether to continue 
distribution of water to the distriet and landowners after 
termination of the contract, and fails or refuses to recognize 
the debtor-creditor relationship of the parties for repayment 
of costs of construction. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., W att>rs, § 631, 638 et seq.; Am.Jur., Irrigation, 
§ 83 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Waters, §§529, .538; [2] Waters, 
§§164, 167; [3, 4, 6] Waters, §171; [5, 7] Waters, §176; [8-10] 
Waters, § 538. 
